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This working paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate 
Governance. Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of corporate governance factors and family 
ties  on  the  pay  of  managing  directors  in  a  sample  of  Indian  stock  listed 
companies. It uses a unique seven-year firm level panel dataset and controls for 
firm performance and both CEO and firm specific fixed effects. The hypothesis 
is that corporate governance, ownership structures and market pressure shape 
the power relations between the board and managers, and affect the level and 
structure  of  CEO  pay.  The  evidence  for  India  supports  these  hypotheses. 
Managing  directors,  who  are  related  to  the  founding  family,  or  controlling 
group, or any of the members on the board of directors, are paid more. This 
holds  for  total  pay  and  both  for  the  less  variable  component  and  the 
performance-related  component  of  pay.  In  contrast,  the  presence  of  outside 
representatives on the board - non-executive directors or nominees of creditors 
or institutional investors - is found to have a disciplinary effect. The presence of 
nominees lowers the level of pay and that of non-executives ties pay more to 
firm performance. A further timely finding is that the staged introduction of a 
recent mandatory corporate governance code, aiming to improve governance 
and pay disclosure in listed companies, has raised the tendency of firms to tie 
pay explicitly to firm performance. Overall, the practice of tying pay explicitly 
to performance has become more common over time. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Are managers of companies paid for their performance and experience, or do 
other factors affect managerial pay? Do managers themselves have considerable 
influence on the setting of pay and what factors constrain this? These questions 
continue to interest many, from academia to media. This paper contributes to 
this  debate  by  examining  the  effects  of  corporate  governance  and  family 
relationships on the pay of managing directors in Indian stock listed companies. 
While doing so, it also reveals general features about the nature of the labour 
market for managing directors in an emerging economy. The analysis relies on a 
self-constructed seven-year panel dataset of roughly 300 companies. Many of 
the companies in the sample are controlled by the founding family, which owns 
a significant share of equity.  
 
Executive  remuneration  was  strictly  regulated  in  India  until  1993-94  by  the 
Companies Act, which imposed a relatively low upper ceiling on the level of 
pay. Since restrictions on executive pay have been relaxed considerably, claims 
have emerged that the gap between managerial and ordinary worker pay has 
increased.  In  general,  some  evidence  suggests  that  the  wage  differential 
between regular skilled and unskilled workers has risen over the past 20 years 
(see e.g. Vasudeva-Dutta, 2005). A study (Kakani and Ray, 2002) examining a 
small sample of large Indian firms finds that the growth in absolute managerial 
remuneration over the period 1979-2001 was over four times that of the growth 
of employee wages within these firms.  
 
Such developments would not be unique to India, given the evidence of a rising 
trend in top income shares in advanced countries such as the United States, or 
the United Kingdom (see e.g. Piketty and Saez, 2006). If managerial pay has 
indeed  grown  rapidly,  one  possibility  is  that  previous  restrictions  may  have 
succeeded  in  preventing  excessive  pay  to  CEOs  in  India.
i  Kakani  and  Ray 
suggest that another possible reason for pay increases for Indian managers could 
be the need to attract and retain talent as the economy has become more open to 
competition and talent a more crucial input. However, little has been written 
about the determinants of CEO pay in Indian companies and the differences in 
pay attributable to different governance structures (see Ghosh (2006) and Sarkar 
and Sen (1996) for existing work).  
 
The main hypothesis in this paper is that the power relationships between the 
managing  director  and  the  Board  of  Directors  vary  according  to  corporate 
governance and ownership structures. These relationships can affect the setting 
of  managerial  pay.  Differences  in  such  structures  could  explain  why  both   2 
optimal contracting and executive talent can be insufficient explanations for the 
setting of pay. The optimal contracting approach holds that in a widely-held 
company  managerial  pay  should  vary  according  to  firm  performance,  since 
tying  pay  to  performance  functions  as  an  incentive  mechanism  to  align  the 
interest  of  managers  with  those  of  shareholders  (see  e.g.  Hart,  1983, 
Holmstrom,  1979).  By  having  control  over  CEO  pay,  owners  can  influence 
CEO behaviour.   
 
Empirical evidence over recent decades questions the importance of the role of 
firm  performance  in  managerial  pay  (see  e.g.  Jensen  and  Murphy,  1992). 
Among others Bebchuk et al. (2002) have claimed, that the idea of a CEO as an 
agent who can be controlled by owners via pay is unrealistic. According to their 
“managerial power” hypothesis, boards may decide the level of CEO pay, but in 
reality CEOs in widely-held companies are likely to have considerable power 
over their pay determination. Dispersed ownership leads to a lack of oversight, 
and individual owners are not powerful enough to control wage setting or lack 
the interest. This leads to CEOs being paid “above performance”. The general 
principal-agent setting of board and manager relations is even less appropriate 
for companies, where management and ownership are more closely linked, and 
not only is ownership concentrated, but members of founding families also tend 
to manage the firms. Concentration of ownership within a family is prominent 
around the world (see e.g. La Porta et al., 1999).  
 
This paper focuses on the effects of family ties, outsiders on the board and the 
consequences of a change in corporate governance regulation on executive pay 
structures in Indian companies. The purpose is to analyse whether corporate 
governance factors do affect CEO pay and whether regulatory change aiming to 
improve corporate governance has the potential to change pay practices. The 
impact of family relationships is examined. In particular, whether the CEO is 
related to another board member, to the founders, or controlling group of the 
firm, or alternatively measured by the share of board members who are related 
to the CEO. 
 
Research on the effects of family connections on executive pay is limited (see 
e.g. Bates et al. (2000) for one study). This arrangement may reduce agency 
problems linked with a mismatch of interests between owners and managers 
described  above,  and  reduce  the  need  for  incentive  pay.  However,  power 
granted to the manager via ownership and family connections could affect the 
CEO’s capacity to influence his, or her, own pay. It is possible, that due to 
family ties, pay is above the level attributed to the manager’s ability, experience 
and capacity to generate profits. Pay may function as a channel of distributing   3 
family wealth. This relates to the literature on opportunities for rent extraction 
in  family  firms  (see  e.g.  Bebchuk,  1999,  Johnson  et  al.,  2000,  Morck  and 
Yeung, 2003) and the consequences of a lack of meritocracy in the managerial 
labour market (see e.g. Burkart et al., 2002, Caselli and Gennaioli, 2004, Bloom 
and  Van  Reenen,  2006).  Higher  pay  could  also  be  the  result  of  bargaining 
power, if the there is a desire to keep management within the family, and the 
potential  candidate  has  attractive  outside  options.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
market for CEOs is relatively uncompetitive, CEO pay should depend less on 
the market wage and could even be lower for family managers.  
 
A mandatory corporate governance code for listed companies (Clause 49) on 
board composition and information disclosure was introduced by the Securities 
and Exchange Board (SEBI) of India during the seven-year period covered by 
the  sample.  Among  other  things,  the  code  requires  companies  to  disclose 
separately the components of directors’ remuneration, both those that are fixed 
and  performance-linked,  as  part  of  the  Corporate  Governance  Report  in  the 
annual report. Given the staged nature of its introduction, it is possible to test 
whether a regulatory change that proxies for improved corporate governance 
standards and visible pay disclosure, has affected the level and performance-
orientation of CEO pay. Increased visibility could perform the function of a 
monitor. A similar argument has been suggested for the role of the media as a 
monitor  of  corporate  governance  (see  e.g.  Dyck  and  Zingales,  2004). 
Chhaochharia  and  Grinstein  (2006)  recently  find  that  changes  in  corporate 
governance  regulation  due  to  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  led  to  a  decrease  in 
executive pay in the US, which they attribute to an increase in board oversight.  
 
This paper distinguishes between the determinants of salary (fixed pay) and 
performance-related pay, but also examines total pay. Performance-related pay 
is a practice adopted by some, but not all firms, to pay a part of remuneration as 
a share of current year profits. Thus, in addition to looking at the determinants 
of the more fixed component of pay (salary), the paper examines whether some 
corporate governance arrangements are more conducive to greater performance 
orientation in pay.  
  
The use of panel data allows us to include fixed effects, and thus control for 
unobserved  time  invariant  determinants  of  pay.  The  regression  models  also 
control for firm performance, size and CEO characteristics, such as experience 
and  education.  This  should  minimise  the  chances  that  the  coefficients  on 
corporate governance variables reflect factors related to performance, or CEO 
ability,  or  other  firm,  or  individual,  specific  fixed  characteristics.  This  is 
important,  since  it  is  often  difficult  to  disentangle  the  role  of  corporate   4 
governance  from  unobserved  factors  that  correlate  with  governance  or 
individual ability. A majority of the prior research on this topic does not make 
use of panel data techniques component (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 
or Hartzell and Starks, 2003 for exceptions). Eriksson (2005) also mentions this 
as one of the deficiencies of existing studies.  
 
The  paper  finds  that  differences  in  corporate  governance  arrangements,  that 
potentially shape the power relations between the board and managers, affect 
CEO pay. The results broadly lend support to the managerial power hypothesis 
on CEO pay determination. It is shown that CEOs who are members of the 
founding family, or are related to a member of the board of directors, are paid 
more in total, both in the form of salary and a share of profits handed out as 
performance-related pay. On the other hand, outside representation does affect 
pay, mainly supporting the view that outsiders can discipline the level of CEO 
pay.  The  same  holds  for  the  degree  of  indebtedness  of  the  company.  The 
introduction  of  the  mandatory  corporate  governance  code,  implemented  in 
stages across firms, has raised the tendency of firms to tie pay to performance. 
Firm  accounting  returns  do  appear  to  affect  pay  to  some  extent,  but  the 
interpretation  of  the  estimated  coefficients  requires  caution.  The  role  of 
performance is likely to be stronger in some firms than others, as some have 
opted to tie pay explicitly to current financial year performance.                                                        
 
Section  2  of  this  paper  reviews  briefly  the  related  existing  literature  on 
managerial pay. Section 3 describes the legal and institutional environment in 
which listed Indian companies operate. Section 4 describes the dataset used, and 
section 5 puts forth the hypotheses to be tested and describes the modelling 
approach. Sections 6 reports the results, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Existing literature 
 
This section summarises briefly the main existing theories and some empirical 
results on managerial pay. There is no discussion of stock options as these are 
not yet a common component of CEO pay in India.  
 
Early literature on the determinants of executive pay looks at the effects that 
competition for talent has on managerial pay in a cross-sectional context (see 
e.g.  Marris,  1967  and  Cosh,  1975).  Managers  are  compensated  for  their 
executive ability, which varies by individual and here is considered the capacity 
to generate profits. In a perfectly competitive market, managers would be paid 
their marginal product; taking into account the excess profit generated by the 
manager compared to the next best manager. If the manager is given a share of   5 
firm  profit,  managerial  pay  is  likely  to  be  higher  in  larger  firms,  since  in 
absolute terms a more able manager will generate a higher profit in a larger 
firm. Thus, more able managers will sort themselves to larger firms. 
 
The optimal contracting approach has been the prominent framework in the 
analysis  of  executive  compensation  in  the  past  decades.  The  required 
assumption  is  that  owners  are  interested  in  shareholder  value  maximisation, 
whereas this may not be of primary concern to the CEO, who tries to minimise 
effort (e.g. Hart, 1983, Holmstrom, 1979). Owners cannot observe managerial 
effort, and thus tie pay to performance in order to minimise agency problems 
and  raise  effort.  Other  noteworthy  work  on  incentives  and  executive 
compensation  relates  to  tournaments  (see  e.g.  Lazear  and  Rosen,  1981  and 
Demsetz,  1995).  In  this  context,  promotion  depends  on  the  performance  of 
workers with respect to other workers competing for the same post, and higher 
pay at the top is used to provide the incentive to compete earlier on. This is one 
explanation for divergence of pay from year to year performance. Other theories 
on incentive pay, such as seniority pay (see e.g. Lazear, 1999) may not matter at 
the CEO level, but such deferred payments would be another standard reason 
for divergence of pay from marginal product. 
 
The recent interest in the estimation of performance-pay sensitivities of CEO 
pay derives partly from the observations that CEOs are receiving very generous 
pay packages, especially in the United States. Jensen and Murphy (1990) find 
that  the  relationship  between  performance  and  CEO  pay  in  public  US 
companies is weak, and has decreased since the 1930s. On the other hand, Hall 
and Liebman (1998) argue that largely due to the increase in the use of stock 
options,  CEO  compensation  in  the  United  States  has  in  fact  become  more 
responsive to performance over the period 1980-1995. They also find that the 
level of real CEO compensation has risen, with a much faster pace than that of 
the pay of all workers, or government and public workers. The explanation for 
these  large  rises  that  cannot  be  attributed  to  rises  in  firm  performance  has 
become a source of debate. 
 
Bebchuk  et  al.  (2002)  present  managerial  power  as  one  explanation  for  the 
levels of CEO pay in widely-held firm. They claim that this is reflected for 
instance in the design of stock option schemes, that are far from optimal from 
the  viewpoint  of  shareholder  value  maximisation.  CEOs  also  often  have 
influence over the nomination or choice of board members, and board members 
themselves may find their position threatened by disagreements. It should be 
noted that these authors question the applicability of this argument in a family-
firm context, since due to more lucrative opportunities of rent extraction, family   6 
connections  might  be  less  likely  to  lead  to  higher  executive  pay.  Such 
opportunities can be created for instance by the differentiation of cash flow and 
control rights via pyramidal ownership structures, or dual class shares. Family 
firms  that  are  part  of  a  business  group  may  foster  tunnelling  of  resources 
between firms (see e.g. Johnson et al., 2000, Morck and Yeung, 2003). Bertrand 
et al. (2002) find evidence that tunnelling occurs between Indian firms that are 
part of a business group.
ii Such practices allow for expropriation of minority 
shareholders  by  majority  shareholders.  Although  the  amount  that  can  be 
extracted is likely to be lower, pay could also be considered a channel for such 
activity, if higher pay results from kinship with an owner, or board member.
iii 
 
Pay above performance and ability could be constrained by several factors. It 
has been suggested that managerial rent extraction via pay can be reduced by 
concentration  of  ownership  within  the  hands  of  groups,  or  individuals,  who 
have an interest in monitoring the company and the CEO (see e.g. Bertrand et 
al. 2001) and have a representative on the company board. The same argument 
could be given for the presence of truly independent outsiders on the board who 
are able to influence decision-making. In many countries, corporate regulation 
requires a certain share of the board directors to be independent. The market for 
corporate control, or future capital, might act as a deterrent to excessive pay, if 
this creates a negative image in the eyes of investors (see Bebchuk et. al, 2002). 
Especially in a developing country context, equity holding by foreigners and 
listing on a foreign stock market may lead to higher governance requirements. If 
product  market  competition  raises  performance  requirements,  incentive 
contracts may become steeper (see Cunat and Guadalupe, 2005).  
 
Some  support  for  managerial  power  as  a  pay  determinant  can  be  found  in 
existing empirical studies. Studies suggest that the lack of independent outside 
directors on the board raises CEO pay, along with the share of board members 
appointed by the CEO (Core et al., 1999). The concentration of institutional 
ownership,  or  presence  of  a  large  shareholder  on  the  board,  are  found  to 
constrain  the  level  of  compensation,  but  make  pay  more  sensitive  to 
performance  (Hartzell  and  Starks,  2003,  Bertrand  and  Mullainathan,  2001). 
Elston and Goldberg (2003) find that ownership concentration lowers pay also 
in German companies. Additionally, some recent evidence suggests that CEOs 
in US companies are more prone to manipulate earnings when their pay is tied 
more  closely  to  the  value  of  stock  and  option  holdings  (Bergstresser  and 
Philippon, 2006). 
 
As mentioned, existing work on CEO pay in India is scarce. In one of the few 
existing  studies  on  Indian  executive  pay,  Ghosh  (2006)  focuses  on  the   7 
determinants of aggregate compensation of the Board of Directors, but does 
include a brief analysis on total CEO compensation using industry-level fixed 
effects. He finds that the total CEO compensation in India is significantly and 
positively affected by the time spent by the CEO in the firm, firm return on 
assets and sales, CEO relationship with the founding family of the firm or group 
of firms, CEO chairmanship, the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board and firm age. Investment in research and development, and the number of 
products and plants also matter.
iv This study uses similar data sources as Ghosh 
(2006),  but  focuses  on  CEO  compensation  in  more  detail.  The  modelling 
approach is also more precise as it uses firm and CEO-specific fixed effects, 
whereas Ghosh estimates a pooled model, and many of the variables in this 
study are not included by Ghosh. However, this paper will show that his result 
on  family  connections  prevails  when  family  connections  are  measured  in 




3 Corporate governance and the legal environment in India 
 
The  main  legal  framework  governing  the  activity  of  Indian  stock  listed 
companies is the Companies Act 1956 and its revisions. Firms also need to 
comply  with  various  guidelines  set  by  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Board 
(SEBI), such as the Corporate Governance code (2000) and the Takeover code 
(1997). There are 24 stock exchanges in India, of which the National Stock 
Exchange and Bombay Stock Exchange are the largest. The most common title 
for a CEO in India is  managing director. This paper uses both expressions. 
Members  of  the  board  of  directors  tend  to  be  proposed  by  boards  in  India. 
Shareholders can also propose members, but rarely do so.
vi  
 
The 1956 Companies Act (section 217 (2A)) obliges companies to disclose in 
their  annual  report  the  compensation  of  individual  executives  and  other 
personnel (and their personal details), if compensation exceeded a threshold. 
This threshold was Rs. 600000 per year in 1998 (roughly $US 14500). The 
majority  of  larger  companies  tend  to  have  some  form  of  a  remuneration 
committee,  as  this  has  become  a  recommendation  of  the  recent  Corporate 
Governance  Code,  and  remuneration  is  generally  approved  by  the  Board  of 
Directors. Executive remuneration was strictly regulated by the Companies Act 
until 1993-1994, with an upper ceiling placed on monthly remuneration (Rs. 
15000 in the final year) of larger firms (see e.g. Sarkar and Sen, 1996).  
 
The 1956 Companies Act (section 387) specifies that managing directors of a 
public company may be remunerated “either by way of a monthly payment or at   8 
a specified percentage of net profits of the company or partly by one and partly 
by the other”. The computation of net profits is also provided in the Act. Such 
remuneration shall not exceed 5 percent of the net profits of the company in 
case the company has one managing director and 10 percent in the case that 
there  is  more  than  one  managing  director  except  with  the  approval  of  the 
Central  Government.  Many  companies  have  opted  for  a  combined  payment 
procedure  and  the  component  that  is  a  direct  share  of  net  profits  is  titled 
commission.  Additionally,  the  Act  restricts  remuneration  in  the  case  of 
inadequate profits, or a loss, during the year.  
 
The international wave of corporate governance reform has also hit India. In 
1998,  the  Confederation  of  Indian  Industries  (CII)  designed  a  voluntary 
corporate governance code; a set of guidelines that companies could adopt as a 
signal of desirable practices. A mandatory corporate governance code for public 
companies, designed by the Kumar Mangalam Birla committee, was accepted 
and ratified by SEBI in year 2000. The code is incorporated as Clause 49 in the 
Listing Agreement of the Stock Exchanges.
vii The implementation of the code 
was  to  be  staged  across  firms;  first  involving  the  largest  listed  companies 
determined on the basis of the value of paid-up equity capital of the company. 
Thus firms belonging to the “A list” of the Bombay Stock Exchange
viii and all 
newly listed companies were ordered to implement the code by March 2001; 
those with paid up equity capital above Rs. 100 million, or net worth above Rs. 
250 million at any point in the company’s history, by March 2002; and those 
with paid up equity capital above Rs. 30 million by March 2003.  
 
Among others things, the mandatory code specifies that no less than 50 percent 
of  board  members  should  be  non-executive.  It  also  includes  requirements 
concerning independent directors. If the chairman of the board is an executive 
director 50 percent of directors should be independent, otherwise 30 percent is 
sufficient. The code includes a definition of an independent director. Further, it 
also sets requirements on the role of the audit committee and on the disclosure 
of  information  to  shareholders.  Importantly  from  the  perspective  of 
compensation, the code requires companies to disclose information separately 
on  all  components  of  directors’  remuneration,  both  those  that  are  fixed  and 
those that are performance-linked in a standardised format as part of a report on 
Corporate Governance in the annual report. Prior to this, companies were only 
obliged to report total remuneration and if commission was reported separately, 
this information was hidden among the last sections on accounts in the annual 
report. There have since been revisions to the code, and compliance has been 
questioned. One issue of concern has been the varying quality of disclosure.
ix    9 
Government-owned development finance institutions, insurance companies and 
mutual funds (e.g. Unit Trust of India) have tended to hold considerable shares 
of equity in Indian firms and often have a representative, a nominee director, on 
the  board  of  directors.  The  development  finance  institutions  have  also  been 
major lenders and played a similar role as large German banks did in German 
companies. (see e.g. Goswami, 2003, Sarkar and Sarkar, 1999). As has been 
argued above in relation to the presence of large shareholders, or institutional 
investors,  such  representation  on  the  board  of  directors  could  discipline 
managers.  However,  doubts  have  been  expressed  about  the  powers  of  such 
directors in India. According to Goswami (2003) they have tended to adhere 
mainly with the board on decisions and lacked an interest in firm performance, 
likely to be attributable to state ownership. Similar doubts could be expressed 
about the powers of non-executive directors, as they may not be independent, 
but retired former managing directors, or business pals. 
 
Some changes in corporate taxation have taken place over the period covered by 
the study. In a review of Indian tax reforms,  Rao (2005) concludes that no 
major changes have happened in personal income taxation or corporate income 
taxation  since  1997/98,  with  the  exception  of  frequent  changes  in  dividend 
taxation. Corporate tax rates have declined during the 1990s, although a study 
by  the  Federation  of  Indian  Chambers  of  Commerce  and  Industry  (FICCI) 
calculates the overall burden of direct taxation on companies to be at 40% in 
early  2006
x.  The  forms  of  distributing  wealth  within  the  family  could 
potentially be affected by the tax regime. A 1997 amendment to the Income Tax 
Act exempted shareholders from tax on dividends, with the companies being 
responsible for a dividend distribution tax of 10% at the time. However, this 
amendment has been reversed and reintroduced with changes taking place in the 
tax rates since. O this basis, no clear predictions can be made on the effects of 
the tax regime on the distribution of wealth within the controlling family of a 
company.    
 
4 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
4.1 Data collection 
The  dataset  used  in  this  study  is  a  seven  year  unbalanced  panel  dataset  of 
companies listed on Indian stock exchanges. The data comes from two sources. 
The  first  is  the  Prowess  database  maintained  by  the  Centre  for  Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE), which includes company accounts and share price 
data as well as background information since the year 1989. According to the 
CMIE  website  (September  2006)  Prowess  includes  data  on  “all  companies 
traded on India's major stock exchanges and several others including the central   10
public sector enterprises. The database covers most of the organised
xi industrial 
activities, banking and organised financial and other services sectors in India. 
The companies covered in Prowess account for 75 per cent of all corporate 
taxes.” 
The company accounts data obtained from Prowess source are unconsolidated 
and  audited.
xii  The  Prowess  database  does  not  include  information  on 
managerial remuneration, or personal characteristics, of managers, and is used 
only to record financial and balance sheet information as well as equity holding 
information  for  the  companies
xiii.  The  data  for  managerial  remuneration  and 
manager characteristics come from annual reports of companies, provided in 
electronic  format  by  Sansco  Services
xiv.  The  company  provides  electronic 
versions of annual reports of around 3000-4000 Indian companies for the years 
between 1998/99 and 2004/2005. In most companies the financial year runs 
from April to March, and year 1998 in this study refers to 1998/1999 and so 
forth. The firms are ones listed on the National, or Bombay, Stock Exchanges 
(NSE and BSE). To the author’s knowledge, this is the most comprehensive 
available commercial source for annual reports. 
This study is concerned with the determinants of pay in stock listed companies. 
The source for annual reports does not include reports for all listed firms, and 
not all firms report details on managerial pay and director characteristics. This 
is especially the case for the earlier years of the sample, as such companies have 
not until recently been obliged to do so. Thus, the dataset used is not a random, 
or necessarily representative, sample of all Indian stock listed companies. This 
is  a  common  situation  faced  by  researchers  on  corporate  governance  and 
executive pay, often due to constraints set by legal and corporate governance 
standards on company reporting. Annex 1 explains the data collection procedure 
in more detail. The final sample includes those firms that reported managerial 
pay and characteristics and for which annual reports were available for both 
years 1998 and 2002. 
 
The paper treats each firm that functions as an entity, or is listed as such in the 
stock exchange and provides accounts as such, as a separate entity. A large 
share of Indian companies belongs to a business group of several companies. 
Many firms have subsidiaries and there are some cases where the managing 
director of a company holds an executive position in a subsidiary, or a closely 
linked  business  group  company.  For  the  sake  of  clarity  and  due  to  data 
limitations, additional pay resulting from such activities cannot be considered in 
this study.
xv  
   11
The dataset is constructed at the firm level. However, a number of firms have 
more  than  one  managing  director,  the  others  often  titled  joint  managing 
directors. Such firms, including the details of multiple managing directors are 
included  in  the  dataset,  which  means  that  there  can  be  more  than  one 
observation per firm per year. It is worthwhile noting this feature of the dataset, 
since the presence of multiple managers is utilised in the regression analysis. 
Out of total manager-firm observations, 31 percent are such that the managing 
director  does  not  operate  alone.  The  results  presented  would  not  change 
fundamentally  even  if  only  firms  with  one  managing  director  would  be 
examined. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
4.2.1 Firm characteristics 
 
To  provide  a  picture  of  the  degree  of  selection  in  the  sample,  some 
characteristics of the firms in the sample are compared with those of firms that 
can be identified as listed on a stock exchange (market capitalisation reported at 
least for one year) in the Prowess database over the period 1998/99-2004/05. 
The  characteristics  examined  are  sales  (total  income  before  taxes),  market 
capitalisation, total assets, export share of sales and equity ownership structures. 
The audited accounting data in Prowess is annual and refers to figures at the end 
of  the  financial  year.  Data  on  market  capitalisation  and  ownership  used  are 
those for end of March each year. All nominal values of the variables shown are 
deflated using the Industrial Workers Consumer Price Index.
xvi The statistical 
tables can be found in annex 3.
xvii 
 
The  firms  in  the  sample  represent  33  sectors  at  2-digit  National  Industrial 
classification (NIC) level. Roughly half belong to a business group, which is 
common  in  India,  and  75  percent  are  manufacturing  firms  and  23  percent 
service sector firms. There is a larger representation of manufacturing firms in 
the current sample than in listed firms in Prowess (Table 1). A partial reason for 
this  is  that  few  financial  sector  firms  or  banks  are  included  as  these  rarely 
reported figures on managerial pay. In addition to the Companies Act, financial 
companies need to comply with the regulations of the Reserve Bank of India 
and may hold this a priority.  
 
The figures in Tables 2a and 2b reveal that firms in the sample data are larger in 
terms of average sales and market capitalisation than the average Indian stock 
listed firm. The average of market capitalisation is over twice as large as that of 
listed  firms  in  Prowess.  However,  the  average  value  of  total  assets  is  not   12
larger.
xviii A ranking of Prowess firms based on average end of year (March) 
market capitalisation over the period 1998-2003 reveals that out of the firms in 
the sample used in this study, 5.6 percent fall within the top 100 listed firms in 
the Prowess sample, 28 percent within the top 500, 54 percent within the top 
1000 and 81 percent within the top 2000.
xix Thus, although the dataset is biased 
towards large listed companies, it is not just restricted to top companies.  
 
Data on equity ownership are available in the Prowess database only from the 
year 2000 onwards due to changes in the requirements on firms concerning 
reporting  of  ownership.  Prowess  uses  the  same  classification  of  equity 
ownership as the firms in their annual reports since year 2000, which follows 
SEBI  regulations.  Some  of  the  firms  in  the  sample  lack  information  on 
ownership for one, or more, years. Some change in the ownership pattern does 
occur  during  the  period  covered  in  the  sample.  Due  to  the  prevalence  of 
business groups, cross-holdings are common and ownership information can 
give an inaccurate picture of ultimate ownership.  
 
In the regression analysis, data on foreign ownership is supplemented with data 
for available companies from the Bombay Stock Exchange Official Directory 
for the years 1998 and 1999. Due to changes in categorisation in reporting, this 
is the only category for which the sources can be reconciled. It was possible to 
construct  a  total  foreign  ownership  figure  for  1998-2004  (see  “total  foreign 
equity holding” in Table 2a), but data on this is missing for a significant share 
of the companies for the years 1998 and 1999. The ownership data available are 
not  considered  adequate  enough  to  enable  the  construction  of  appropriate 
measures  of  ownership  concentration  within  the  ownership  categories 
identified.  Since  information  is  missing  for  some  companies  and  is  only 
available for five years, equity ownership is not the focus of this paper, but 
general patterns are discussed below. 
The figures confirm that ownership concentration within the founding family, or 
promoter group, is still widespread in India, the average share of equity held by 
promoters being 45 percent. Over the period 2000-2004, there were 23 firms in 
the  sample,  where  the  share  of  equity  held  by  promoters  was  less  than  20 
percent. For over a half of the companies, the corresponding share was below 
50  percent  during  this  period.  The  Securities  and  Exchange  Board  2002 
(amendment  to  Clause  on  Substantial  Acquisition  of  Shares  and  Takeovers) 
definition for a promoter includes “the person or persons who are in control of 
the  company,  directly  or  indirectly,  whether  as  a  shareholder,  director  or 
otherwise; or person or persons named as promoters in any document of offer of 
securities to the public or existing shareholders”. Generally, promoters refer to 
founding members of the firm, or business groups, or their relatives, who have   13
control over the firm via ownership and otherwise. There are no firms in the 
sample, where the government would directly be a promoter. 
The general pattern of ownership is similar for the sample firms and the average 
listed firm. Foreign ownership in total is slightly higher in the sample than in 
the  average  Prowess  firm,  for  instance  for  the  period  2000-2004,  average 
foreign  ownership  is  10  percent  in  the  sample  firms  and  7.5  percent  in  the 
Prowess firms.
xx The same holds for institutional ownership, since the average 
share in the sample firms is 11 percent and that in Prowess firms 6 percent. 
Approximately 4 percent of the firms in the sample are classified in Prowess as 
foreign  owned  firms.  There  are  46  firms,  where  foreign  promoters  and 
collaborators hold over 10 percent of equity in any year between 2000-2004. As 
many as 53 percent of the firms have foreign institutional investors as owners, 
although  the  average  share  is  only  2.3  percent.  Equity  ownership  by  non-
resident Indians (NRIs) and banks and financial institutions is similar in both 
samples. Regulations on foreign equity investment have been loosened since 
1991.  
Out of the total 59 Indian firms listed in a foreign stock exchange in year 2004, 
25  are  included  in  the  sample.  The  rest  either  surprisingly  had  insufficient 
information for the year 1998 (which defined firms to be included in sample), or 
the  annual  report  was  not  available  in  the  selection.
xxi  The  foreign  stock 
exchanges considered are the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Nasdaq, the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Luxembourg Stock Exchange (Luxse).  
 
4.2.2 Managing directors’ compensation 
 
The total compensation figure of a managing director considered in this study is 
that  of  gross  remuneration,  which  should  according  to  legal  requirements 
(Companies Act) include salary, commission, contribution to a retirement or old 
age pension plan (provident fund) and perquisites.
xxii Due to regulations set by 
the  Companies  Act  (see  Section  3),  the  remuneration  of  Indian  managing 
directors can be decomposed into a more or less fixed component from the 
viewpoint  of  the  director  (monthly  salary)  and  a  performance-linked  more 
variable  component,  which  is  the  commission  paid  on  the  basis  of  current 
financial year performance. 
 
Fixed pay is evidently not entirely fixed, as items such as perquisites can be 
considered variable. Commission is determined as a share of end of year profit 
before tax after some modifications, calculated according to guidelines set in 
the Companies Act. This profit figure is not available in Prowess in a form that 
would be comparable across firms. Commission is only paid if the current year   14
profit is judged to be sufficient, on which there are regulatory guidelines. In 
principle, this holds also for any other form of pay, but adjustment for this is 
often transferred to the consecutive year. Many firms in the sample offer stock 
options to employees, but very rarely report having offered such to the CEO. In 
fact, the SEBI guidelines on Employee Stock Option Schemes and Employee 
Stock Purchase Schemes (1999, amended 2004) prohibit the granting of stock 
options to promoters of the company and their relatives and anyone who owns 
more than 10 percent of company equity. Indian companies are obliged to report 
stock options granted to executives within the year, but as less than 10 firms in 
the sample report to have offered such in the recent years, this component is 
ignored.  Stock  options  have  been  most  common  in  the  Indian  IT  industry, 
pioneered by software company Infosys. 
 
The average gross remuneration of a managing director in the period 1998-2004 
is Rs. 4,019,008  in constant 2004 prices (see Table 4 for annual compensation). 
To obtain an approximate international comparison, the dataset used by Hall 
and Liebman (1998) shows that in year 1994, the average salary and bonus of a 
US large firm managing director amounted to US$ 1,292,290 (1994 prices), 
excluding stock options, and US$ 2,505,469 including the latter. In year 1998, 
the average Indian CEO in the whole data sample earned Rs. 1,575,814 (approx. 
US$ 37,500), in year 1996 prices. The earnings of a US CEO in year 1994 were 
34-fold the Indian 1998 average, and 67-fold if stock options are included.  
 
Despite appearing small at the international level, the earnings of Indian CEOs 
are large at the national level. The average wage of managing directors in the 
sample in year 1998 is 120 times that of the average annual earnings of an 
average factory worker in India in 1998
xxiii. The wage of a US CEO in year 
1994 compared with that of a production, or non-supervisory worker, in the 
manufacturing  industry  was  45  or  87  times  higher,  excluding  and  including 
stock  options  respectively.
xxiv  It  appears  that  Indian  CEOs  tend  to  hold 
significantly larger shares of company equity than their US counterparts. In the 
Hall and Liebman (1998) dataset, the average US CEO shareholding was 2.2 
percent, whereas in the Indian data sample, it is 10 in the last year. 
 
The level of executive pay (see Table 4) has risen steadily except for the year 
2002, which followed a year of stagnation both in the sample firms and Indian 
industry in general. The phenomenal rise in the average level of commission 
compared with the rise in fixed pay could simply be explained by the rise in 
average  profits,  as  commission  is  paid  as  a  share  of  profits.  However,  the 
average share of profits handed out as commission has also risen between 1998 
and 2004, but this is to a large extent explained by the increase in the share of   15
firms  that  pay  commission.  If  we  restrict  our  attention  to  firms  that  pay 
commission, each year in the sample, the percentage share of profits paid as 
commission oscillates between 1.8 and 2.1 between 1998 and 2004, without any 
significant  overall  increase.  In  the  year  1998,  34  percent  of  the  managing 
directors are paid commission and by the year 2004, the percentage is 51 (Table 
4).
xxv The share of commission in total pay has also risen throughout the years 
excluding the year 2002. These observations are not sensitive to the fact that 
information for some firms is missing in certain years. 
 
These developments raise an interesting question about the extent to which the 
increases in executive pay over the period can be attributed simply to changes in 
performance, or whether there are other significant factors that lie behind these 
increases?  The  level  of  fixed  pay  has  also  risen,  although  not  at  a  rate 
comparable with commission. Commission appears to be driving the increases 
in average total pay and the rise in the share of commission in profits is to a 
large extent attributable to the rise in the share of firms paying commission. It is 
worthwhile emphasising here that during the period in question, a corporate 
governance  code,  which  made  the  reporting  of  commission  mandatory  in  a 
visible and standardised format, came into force. As paying for performance 
could be considered a desirable practice, it may have become more prominent 
as the levels paid by all firms became easily observable. The hypothesis will be 
tested empirically. 
 
5 Modelling approach 
 
The purpose of the models to be presented is to examine the effects of corporate 
governance and family ties on both the level and performance orientation of 
CEO pay. They analyse separately the determinants of commission paid as a 
share of profits and fixed pay. A brief analysis of the level of total pay is also 
included.  The  focus  is  on  examining  whether  some  forms  of  corporate 
governance raise the manager’s capacity to influence his, or her, pay and others 
lower it. Once we control for firm performance, size and firm, or CEO-specific, 
fixed effects, a relationship between the level of pay and a corporate governance 
factor would mean that managerial pay depends on something else than the 
manager’s ability and capacity to generate profits. The models also control for 
characteristics  such  as  education  and  tenure  that  might  reflect  unobserved 
performance (ability of the CEO), or simply pay for seniority. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the level of fixed pay, which represents mainly a 
monthly payment, is determined at the beginning of the year. If the decision on 
the  level  of  fixed  pay  is  affected  by  firm  performance,  it  should  be  past   16
performance  that  matters.  The  use  of  current  year  governance  variables  as 
explanatory variables maximises the number of years available.
xxvi On the other 
hand,  the  actual  amount  of  commission  paid  should  depend  on  the  level  of 
current year profit achieved. Relying on the above assumptions, Figures 1 and 2 
below show a simplified illustration of the managing director’s wage profile in 
relation to current year profit, assuming that if commission is paid, it is a linear 
function  of  current  year  profits.  The  linearity  assumption  may  not  hold  in 
practice. 
 
The distinction between the two components of pay is considered meaningful, 
since commission and fixed pay are clearly separate components and may have 
different determinants. This is supported by results of basic regressions on the 
determinants of the level of both types of pay for firm observations that include 
both components. The models in this paper examine the determinants of the 
share of profits paid as commission rather than the level of commission. This 
seems logical as commission is determined as a share of profit and the chosen 
variable can reveal more about the nature of the contract. It also allows us to 
examine  directly  what  factors  affect  the  performance  orientation  of  pay. 
Another  option  for  analysing  this  last  issue  would  be  to  regress  pay  on 
interaction  terms  between  firm  performance  and  corporate  governance 
variables. Given that there are several of such variables, the procedure easily 
leads to significant co-linearity, and is also questionable if we are concerned 
with a potential bias on the coefficient on performance (see below). The chosen 
approach averts such problems, but evidently examines the effect of corporate 
governance on performance sensitivity only via commission, not total pay.  
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Figure 1 CEO wage profile 
 
Figure 2 CEO wage profile: Pay becomes more performance-oriented   
 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that for an understanding of the effect of corporate 
governance on pay, it is useful to assess the effects on fixed pay in conjunction 
with the effects on the share of profits paid as commission. If there is no effect, 
or a negative effect, on fixed pay and a positive one on the share of profits paid 
as commission, performance will play a larger role in pay (see Figure 2). On the 
other hand, if a certain governance factor raises both components of pay, or   18
only  fixed  pay,  we  cannot  conclude  that  pay  would  have  become  more 
performance  oriented.  An  additional  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  total 
compensation is included. This approach may be less precise than the one that 
separates between the two components. Nevertheless, it is helpful in obtaining a 
balanced  picture  of  the  determinants  of  pay,  since  it  is  possible  that  the 
determinants of fixed pay or their effects differ between firms that do, and do 
not, pay commission. It might be desirable to include separate analyses on fixed 
pay for firms that have a policy of paying commission and those that do not, but 
this  is  problematic  and  the  decision  was  made  to  utilise  all  available 
observations in all models.
xxvii  
 
Most  of  the  estimated  models  include  fixed  effects  that  are  alternatively 
individual, or firm specific. This distinction is possible, since many of the firms 
in the sample have multiple CEOs and managing directors of a firm change. 
Thus, the dataset has multiple CEO-year observations for such firms. When a 
firm has more than one managing director, the fixed effects estimation at the 
firm level relies on deviations from the firm mean. This could in theory lead to 
a  bias  on  the  coefficient  on  variables  that  correlate  with  unobserved  CEO-
specific factors. The use of CEO-specific fixed effects in alternative models 
eliminates  this  problem.  CEO-specific  fixed  effects  control  for  managerial 
ability that is fixed, that is otherwise difficult to measure and would correlate 
with firm performance.   
 
5.1 Fixed pay 
 
The estimated model takes the form 
 
it i t jt it jt it u + D + + = FC + + ′ ′ ′ − α γ V GO δ O CE β F PER 1          ) 1 ( , 
 
where i, j, and t refer to individual, firm, and time respectively. Dt is a year 
dummy, αi is the firm, or individual, specific unobserved fixed effect and β, δ 
and γ are parameter vectors.
xxviii The same model is also estimated using total 
remuneration  (Tit)  as  the  dependent  variable.  FCit  is  annual  “fixed” 
compensation (salary, perquisites and contribution to provident fund) and Tit = 
annual total remuneration (fixed pay + commission). PERF refers to variables 
that relate to firm size and performance, CEO to CEO-specific variables and 
GOV to corporate governance variables. These variables are described in detail 
below.  Brief  definitions  of  the  variables  included  in  the  regressions  can  be 
found  in  annex  2,  and  annex  1  describes  how  the  corporate  governance 
variables were constructed. 
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The estimated models use both individual and firm fixed effects to control for 
time invariant firm and individual characteristics. Thus, αi in equation (1) is, 
either a firm-specific fixed effect for each firm (j) of the managing director (i), 
or an individual-specific fixed effect for each managing director (i). The firm 
fixed effect controls for factors such as the average size of the firm, industry 
and  relatively  fixed  components  over  the  time  period  in  question,  such  as 
hierarchy and organisational structures.  
 
A dummy variable to signal whether the company has more than one managing 
director and year dummies are included in the models. A dummy variable is 
also included in the fixed pay regression to control for whether the firm pays 
commission  (1),  or  not  (0),  since  fixed  pay  could  potentially  be  higher  for 
directors who do not receive commission. Since managing directors can change 
within the firm from one year to another, and lagged performance is used, the 
estimated models exclude observations that correspond to the first year with a 
new  managing  director.  If  managing  directors  are  rewarded  for  good  past 
performance,  it  is  illogical  to  assume  that  a  managing  director  would  be 
compensated for contributions to past performance if he, or she, only entered 
the firm in the current year.
xxix  
 
As described above, firms in the sample are larger than average listed firms. We 
know that the selection includes mainly firms where gross CEO remuneration is 
above Rs. 600000 a year, but also know that not all such firms are included. To 
obtain some indication of the possible effect of sample selection on the results, 
a truncated pooled regression model was estimated and the results compared to 
those of a standard OLS model.
xxx The differences between a pooled OLS and 
the  truncated  regression  turned  out  to  be  fairly  minor,  as  mostly  the  same 
coefficients were significant and the coefficient magnitudes did not differ much. 
The small differences encouragingly suggest that problems caused by sample 
selection are not very significant. No further attempt is made in this paper to 
address this issue. 
 
Performance and size (PERF) 
 
This set of variables includes total sales to reflect firm size and the following 
performance variables: profit before interest and tax as a share of total assets 
(ROA) and average annual end of financial year market capitalisation as a share 
of total assets (valuation ratio, MC). The purpose is to control for time varying 
performance and size to avert a possible endogeneity bias in the coefficients on 
corporate  governance  variables.  This  would  arise  if  features  of  corporate 
governance  correlate  with  firm  size  and  performance  and  we  would  not   20
adequately control for performance. It thus seems appropriate to include both 
size and several performance-related variables in the model at the same time. 
The relationship between size and managerial pay has been established by many 
studies. Total borrowing as a share of total assets (debt ratio) is also included, 
the  motivation  being  that  increasing  debt  pressure  can  potentially  have  a 
disciplinary effect on CEO pay.
xxxi 
 
Potential  simultaneous  causality  has  not  traditionally  been  a  concern  in  the 
literature  on  the  relationship  between  CEO  pay  and  performance.  Even  if 
performance orientation of pay would not be explained by an incentive motive, 
the existence of this relationship may affect CEO effort, and thus lead to an 
“effort” bias on the estimated performance coefficient. The direction of the bias 
will depend on how the director’s effort changes in reaction to performance 
sensitivity of pay, i.e. effort may not always increase with higher sensitivity if 
the level of CEO pay is high enough. This should depend on what happens to 
the component of pay that is not affected by performance if the performance 
slope rises. If this does not fall, the CEO might be able to secure the same wage 
as before by putting in less effort.  
 
The main interest in this paper is not on the performance coefficients, but on the 
corporate  governance  variables.  Finding  a  suitable  exogenous  instrumental 
variable for firm performance is challenging. Lagged return on assets is not an 
ideal  candidate  since  fixed  effects  regression  assumes  strict  exogeneity  of 
variables (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 252-254). In the absence of better 
instruments, the paper experiments with lagged industry (2-digit NIC) return to 
assets  and  lagged  industry  export  shares  (both  excluding  the  firm  itself)  as 
instruments  for  lagged  ROA.  These  are  derived  using  the  entire  sample  of 
Prowess firms. It is acknowledged that these may not be perfect instruments in 
satisfying  the  exogeneity  requirements.  The  results  of  this  analysis  are  not 
presented, but the gist of the exercise is that although the coefficient on firm 
ROA  may  change  considerably,  neither  the  coefficients  on  the  corporate 
governance variables nor their significance are significantly altered.  
 
Corporate governance and ownership (GOV) 
 
This category includes  mainly firm-specific (j) variables, but it also seemed 
appropriate to include the variables on CEO kinship, which are CEO-specific (i) 
under this heading. 
Family connections are captured by a dummy variable for whether the CEO is a 
member, or related to the promoters or founding family (FF), which is time-
invariant  across  individuals,  a  dummy  for  whether  the  CEO  is  related  to  a   21
member or members of the Board of Directors (relative), and the share of board 
directors who are related to the CEO are used to measure family connections. 
This last variable can also be interpreted as a measure of the lack of board 
independence.  It  correlates  highly  (see  table  10)  with  both  of  the  dummy 
variables,  and  thus  will  not  be  included  with  either  in  the  same  model.  On 
average 15 percent of the board members are related to the managing director. 
Since the econometric analysis utilises a fixed effects panel model, changes in 
the kinship status that also reflect changes in board composition and not just in 
the  manager  are  of  interest.  Further  disaggregation  by  type  of  family 
relationship was not possible.  
Table 5 shows that 60 percent of managing directors were related to a board 
member in the period 1998-2004, but the share was declining over the period. In 
1998, 63 percent of managing directors were related to a board member, and 
this was down to, 57 percent by 2002. Whether or not the managing director is 
related to a board member is generally reported with the details on remuneration 
required under the Companies Act (section 217). Several family generations 
including  spouses  can  be  represented  in  a  company  board.  Out  of  all  the 
managing directors, 74 percent can be linked to founders or promoters. Being 
considered a member of the founding family in this study is equivalent to being 
a controlling shareholder (promoter), or a member of such a family or group. 
With the exception of a few firms, this relationship is generally one with the 
founders of the firm (see Annex 1).  
It is possible that the effects of kinship depend on the share of equity held by 
promoters, or the CEO. The ability of family CEOs to extract rents could be 
constrained by low equity ownership. The regressions include an interaction 
term between a dummy for significant CEO equity holding in the last year in 
the sample (above 10%) and family association.
xxxii In most firms, CEOs are 
shareholders,  sometimes  with  a  significant  proportion.  Information  on  CEO 
equity holding is available only for the latest year in the Prowess database and 
only reported if it is over 1 percent. This makes it possible to identify whether 
the CEO as an individual holds shares above a certain percent for almost all 
CEOs in that year. The exact amount held is not available for those who hold 
less than 1 percent. On average 16 percent of the CEOs in the sample own more 
than 10 percent of company shares. This information can be inaccurate, since it 
includes only what is stated as individual and direct CEO equity holding and 
does not include indirect ownership. The figure is available only for the latest 
year. 
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Other  governance  variables  are  firm-specific  and  include  the  ratio  of  non-
executive directors on the board of directors, a dummy variable for whether or 
not  there  is  a  nominee  director  or  several  such  on  the  board,  and  a  binary 
variable  indicating  whether  the  firm  is  required  to  implement  the  SEBI 
corporate governance code in a certain year determined on the basis of the value 
of paid up equity capital or net worth in any one of the previous years in the 
sample (see Section 3).  
 
The share of non-executive directors could discipline managerial pay if such 
directors  are  truly  independent  and  have  influence.  Table  10  shows  that 
correlation between the share of family members on the board and the share of 
non-executives is negative, so non-executives are unlikely to represent such in 
any significant  manner. On  average, 74 percent of board members  are non-
executive and around 40 percent of the firms in the sample include a nominee 
director. A nominee director refers to representative of a national development 
finance institution either as a creditor, or equity holder, or in some cases the 
state  government.  The  presence  of  such  representatives  could  be  considered 
analogous to the presence of a large shareholder on the board discussed in the 
literature review. The variable does not differentiate between nominees linked 
with a debt and an equity relationship.
xxxiii  
 
The  presence  of  nominee  directors  could  in  principle  vary  with  equity 
ownership  structures.  The  possibility  that  changes  in  the  share  of  non-
executives simply reflect changes in ownership is mitigated to an extent by the 
inclusion of the nominee dummy and the total percentage share of equity held 
by foreigners. Due to a high number of missing observations for the years 1998 
and 1999 for total foreign equity holding, a missing dummy approach is used to 
enable  as  many observations as possible to be included in the analysis (see 
annex  2  for  definition)
xxxiv.  The  number  of  missing  values  does  lower  the 
quality of this indicator. It is nevertheless included to control for ownership in 
some form. It is worthwhile stressing that the results are not affected in any 
significant manner if this variable is excluded.
xxxv 
 
A dummy variable for whether the firm is listed on a foreign stock exchange is 
also included in all models. Foreign equity holding, or a listing on a foreign 
stock exchange, could be associated with better corporate governance practices. 
The  coefficients  on  these  variables  could  potentially  be  affected  by  the 
possibility that outside investors are attracted towards certain firms specifically 
due to certain type of pay practices. Whether this leads to a significant bias in 
our  case  is  questionable.  In  theory,  the  same  problem  could  affect  the   23
coefficient  on  nominee  directors,  but  it  is  highly  unlikely  given  the  long 
traditions of domestic institutional investment.  
By allocating firms into groups according to Prowess figures on paid up equity 
capital and net worth over the sample period, 11 percent of the firms in the 
sample  in  year  2000/01  fell  under  the  obligations  to  comply  with  the  new 
corporate governance code (see Table 5). This first group includes the Bombay 
Stock Exchange A-list firms.
xxxvi The share was 77 percent in year 2001/02, and 
96 percent from year 2002/03 onwards. A small share of smaller firms in terms 
of equity capital fell outside the implementation schedule in the period covered 
by  the  sample.  The  variable  used  takes  a  value  of  0  before  the  required 
compliance year and a value of 1 thereafter. 
Since  the  regressions  control  for  board  composition  in  several  ways,  the 
potential channel of an effect of the corporate governance code could be the 
change in disclosure requirements on pay, although it is not certain that the 
effects would not arise from changes in governance as well. Since the code was 
to be implemented in stages across three groups of firms, this introduces useful 
firm level variation. The possibility that this variable might simply reflect firm 
size is reduced further by the inclusion of firm, or individual, fixed effects and 
several performance (and size) variables. Since the first firms were obliged to 
comply by the end of the financial year 2000, the effect of this change is most 
likely to affect pay practices in the next year, and the first year that is assigned 
the value of 1 for a subset of firms is 2001. In practice, it is possible that firms 
falling under the obligation to comply may have already done so prior to the 
required  date.
xxxvii  However,  the  effect  of  the  code  in  the  regressions  is  not 
statistically significant effect, if it is assumed to come a year earlier for the 
entire group.   
 
CEO characteristics (CEO) 
 
CEO characteristics included are age and age squared, education, years the CEO 
has spent in the firm (including squared) and a dummy for whether or not the 
CEO  is  the  chairman  of  the  Board.  Managing  directors  almost  without 
exception sit on the board of directors. Around a third of the managing directors 
are chairmen of the Board of Directors. The average number of years spent in 
the firm is 16. This reinforces the perception that the market for managers is 
internal. Most managing directors have a university degree
xxxviii, and thus the 
level of education is captured with a dummy variable for a PhD or MSc degree. 
This is not entirely unjustified. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) for instance show 
that US managers with an MBA tend to have unique management strategies. 
The  model  tests  if  CEO  qualifications,  tenure  or  age  affect  remuneration   24
independently,  in  addition  to  the  possible  effects  that  they  have  on  firm 
performance. The squared terms are included as is common practice and the 
sign  on  the  coefficients  are  expected  to  be  negative.  In  an  individual  fixed 
effects  regression, age  and  tenure  are  co-linear  and  merely  represent  a  time 
trend. 
 
5.2 Pay for performance  
 
There  are  two  ways  to  approach  the  question  on  the  determinants  of 
performance-related pay. The variable of interest is commission as a share of 
profit after interest and tax. It reflects the share of profits available to the firm 
that  is  channelled  to  the  managing  director.  The  first  question  concerns  the 
factors that determine whether a firm pays part of compensation as commission, 
and  the  extent  to  which  corporate  governance  matters  in  this  decision.  The 
second concerns the impact of corporate governance on the share of profits 
handed to the CEO as commission. The first question is examined only briefly 
in  the  interest  of  conciseness  with  the  use  of  a  simple  fixed  effect  linear 
probability model. The estimated model is 
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where Cit = binary variables for whether commission is paid or not and other 
variables as above in model (1). The same explanatory variables as in model 1 
are used, with the exception of current rather than the lagged profit margin 
(ROA), since the justification for this is clearer as commission is only paid if 
current  profit  exceeds  a  threshold.  When  tested,  lagged  ROA  was  not  very 
significant. A fixed effects logit model was estimated, but since the results were 
similar in terms of significant coefficients, they are not discussed.
xxxix  
 
Since  not  all  firms  pay  commission,  the  dependent  variable  (including  the 
values  zero),  will  be  censored,  and  OLS  and  standard  fixed  effects  models 
generally  lead  to  inconsistent  estimates.  The  appropriate  model  is  a  Tobit 
model,  but  the  estimation  of  a  fixed  effects  Tobit  model  is  problematic, 
although some advances have been made in this area (see e.g. Greene, 2004). 
To control for unobserved firm or individual fixed characteristics, normal fixed 
effect  regressions  as  well  as  a  random  effects  censored  Tobit  model  are 
estimated. To try to assess the effect of censoring, a pooled OLS and a pooled 
censored  Tobit  model  were  estimated.  The  same  variables  were  statistically 
significant in these models, which may offer some justification for the use of a 
standard fixed effects model.
xl 
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A Tobit random effects model can be formulated in simple terms as 
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and xit refers to all explanatory variables and CCit = share of commission of net 
profits and other variables are as above in models (1) and (2). The model has a 
composite  error  term  that  includes  a  random  individual-specific  component. 
The standard assumptions of the random effects model would be that the error 
term uit is normally distributed and together with the random individual-specific 
effect  αi,  independent  of  the  explanatory  variables.  The  assumptions  of  the 
random effects model are arguably strong for the type of data used in this study, 
but the main purpose is to compare differences with the standard fixed effects 
regressions.  These  fixed  effects  models  include  the  same  variables  as  the 
random effects model. 
 
The share of profits paid might vary by current year performance, but this is not 
obvious.  The  clear  exception  is  the  case  where  current  year  profits  are 
insufficient and performance too poor for commission to be paid at all. This is 
the main justification for including some performance variables in model (3) 
and current as opposed to past values. We could question the extent to which 
managerial  effort  at  the  CEO  level  changes  from  year  to  year  due  to  the 
possibility of commission, beyond the fact that the manager will try to avoid a 
situation where profit becomes insufficient for commission to be paid at all. The 
same instrumental variables for firm performance as in the fixed pay model 




6 Results  
 
This section describes the results of the estimated models starting with fixed 
pay and total pay and then moves on to look at the determinants of the share of 
profits paid as commission and what determines whether firms pay commission 
or not.  
 
6.1 Results: Fixed pay and total pay 
 
The first four columns in table 6 show the results of fixed effects models on 
fixed pay. FF refers to firm and FI to individual fixed effects and the results of a   26
few different model specifications are reported. The last two columns in the 
table relate to total pay.  
 
Let us concentrate first on the determinants of fixed pay. Models FF1 and FI1 
include the same set of variables, but the first one has firm and the second 
individual  fixed  effects.  In  both  of  these  models,  all  of  the  performance 
variables are statistically significant. A 10 percentage point rise in past year 
ROA  leads  to  a  7  percent  rise  in  fixed  pay.  Given  that  ROA  can  fluctuate 
considerably from year to year, a 10 percentage point change (one standard 
deviation)  within  a  firm  might  not  be  entirely  unrealistic,  but  the  effect  of 
performance on fixed pay does seem rather small.
xlii A one standard deviation 
rise (1.7) in past valuation ratio (MC) of the firm would raise fixed pay only by 
1.7  percent.
xliii  The  coefficient  on  the  debt  ratio  is  negative  and  statistically 
significant,  suggesting  that  within  firm  developments  in  the  debt  ratio  can 
constrain the level of CEO fixed pay. However, a 1 percentage point rise in the 
debt ratio would lower pay by only 0.3 percent, which is a rather small impact.  
 
The variable showing whether or not a CEO is related to a board member is 
statistically significant at the 90 percent level in the firm fixed effects model 
version (FF1). Being related to a board member raises pay by 10 percent. If the 
variable  showing  whether  or  not  the  managing  director  is  a  member  of  the 
founding family is used instead (FF2), it turns out to be highly significant with a 
large positive coefficient (0.31) in the firm fixed effects regressions. In the firm 
fixed effects model on fixed pay, the interaction between the manager’s equity 
holding and the kinship variable is not significant. On the other hand, being 
related to a board member is not significant in the model with individual fixed 
effects, but such kinship leads to significantly higher pay (21 percent) when the 
managing director holds more than 10 percent of equity.
xliv This could imply 
that the manager is in a better position to extract rents if he or she has more 
control also via equity ownership, but too far-reaching conclusions should not 
be  drawn  considering  the  approximate  nature  of  the  CEO  equity  holding 
variable (see Section 5). The results would remain rather similar if instead of 
the dummy variable on family connections, the share of relatives on the board 
would be used (see Table 7).
 Within firm or CEO variance is higher for this 
variable than for the dummy variables.
xlv 
 
There could be several explanations for why the kinship coefficient alone is not 
significant in the individual fixed effects model. With individual fixed effects, 
the relationship variable changes only if the board composition changes, and the 
CEO-specific variation in this relationship variable is relatively low. With firm 
fixed effects, within firm variance is derived additionally from the presence of   27
more than one managing directors or a change in the managing director. This 
may be one explanation. The results imply that a change in the status of the 
managing director from being related, to not being related, to a board member 
might be less significant in explaining pay than family status when either the 
firm has two managing directors with different status, or the managing director 
and simultaneously family status change. On the other hand, the result on the 
role of CEO equity ownership in the individual fixed effects model does suggest 
that relationship with the board may also matter. 
 
In  the  case  of  several  managing  directors,  it  could  be  possible  that  family 
members are given more responsibility or are more able and are thus paid more 
in the firm fixed effects model. The role of responsibility is captured to some 
extent by the variable showing whether the managing director is the chairman 
of the board. The inclusion of education, age and tenure mitigates potential bias 
arising from unobserved individual-specific factors. There is some support for 
either age, or tenure, leading to higher pay, but this result is not robust to model 
specification. The effect of tenure in the individual fixed effects model (FI1) 
looks large, since in this particular model it simultaneously captures the rising 
trend in individual CEO pay (time dummies are included). 
 
How  about  the  effects  of  other  governance  variables?  The  share  of  non-
executives on the board has a negative coefficient, but the effect on fixed pay is 
not  statistically  very  strong.  The  presence  of  a  nominee  director  is  neither 
statistically nor economically significant in explaining fixed pay. Surprisingly, 
considering  the  limited  within  firm  variation,  listing  on  a  foreign  stock 
exchange has a large negative effect on fixed pay. Further investigation reveals 
that in firms that changed status, fixed pay did not fall, but was stagnating in 
comparison with the general rising trend in other firms.
xlvi Foreign ownership is 
statistically significant and positive, but a percentage point rise would raise pay 
only by 0.4-0.5 percent. As explained, this variable is included mainly as a 
control, since quality is questionable. 
 
The requirement to comply with the corporate governance code has a positive 
and significant effect on fixed pay at the 90 and 95 percent levels respectively 
in  models  FF1  and  FI1.  The  magnitude  is  7-9  percent.  Despite  the  staged 
implementation and fixed effects, the possibility remains that the coefficient is 
simply capturing a trend in pay that is different for the firms in each group for 
which implementation was to take place. The result could also be driven by a 
sample  selection  effect,  as  the  share  of  CEOs  for  whom  information  on 
commission was available, was somewhat lower in the years 1998-2000. To test 
for these possibilities, the regressions were re-estimated only for those firms   28
that had reported commission for all years in the sample. Additionally, a group-
specific  time  trend  was  included  for  three  groups  of  firms:  those  that  were 
supposed to implement the code in the year 2000-2001, those in the year 2001-
2002 and those that were too small to fall into any of the groups that were 
assigned a timetable for implementation. The group left out includes firms who 
were supposed to implement the code in the year 2002-2003. The regressions 
control  additionally  for  a  general  trend,  so  that  the  group  trends  capture 
deviations from such. The coefficient on the code remains roughly the same and 
statistically  significant  at  the  95  percent  level  in  model  FI1,  but  no  longer 
significant in the firm fixed effects model (see Table 7). 
 
For the sake of comparison, two models on the determinants of total pay, one 
with firm (FF) and one with individual fixed effects (FI), are estimated. The 
results of two such model specifications are shown in columns 4 and 5 of Table 
6. Both lagged and current ROA are included, since commission is more likely 
to  depend  on  current  profit.  When  this  is  done,  the  significance  of  market 
capitalisation falls. The coefficient on lagged ROA is slightly larger for total 
pay than for fixed pay. In model FF, a 10 percentage point increase in lagged 
ROA translates into a 9 percent increase in total pay and a similar rise in current 
ROA to a 14 percent increase. 
 
Being related to a board director results in approximately 10 percent higher total 
pay (90 percent significance) in the firm fixed effects (FF) model, and being a 
member of the founding family to 27 percent higher total pay. Only the results 
of the model with the latter are shown in Table 7. The interaction term between 
manager equity holding above 10 percent and being related to a board member 
is  again  significant  and  positive  in  the  individual  (FI)  fixed  effect  model. 
Related CEOs who own more than 10 percent of equity, are paid significantly 
more. The result persists if the share of board members related to the managing 
director is used as the kinship variable (see Table 7). If included on its own, the 




Interestingly, the coefficient on the presence of nominee directors is significant 
and  negative,  suggesting  that  in  contrast  with  current  perception,  such 
representation could lower managerial power over pay. The magnitude is 8-9 
percent. Nominee directors, being representatives of institutional shareholders 
and creditors should have an interest in curtailing excessive pay. The corporate 
governance  code  raises  total  pay  by  13-14  percent.  This  result  remains 
statistically significant at the 95 percent level after the inclusion of group trends, 
but  the  significance  falls  if  the  sample  is  restricted  to  firms  who  reported   29
information on commission in each year (see table 7). The effect of foreign 
ownership is similar as for fixed pay.
xlvii 
 
One might be interested in comparing the performance orientation of Indian 
CEO pay with that of CEOs in other countries. As already explained, accurate 
estimation  of  the  coefficients  on  ROA  is  problematic.  However,  since 
instruments are often not used in this analysis, simply for the sake of interest, let 
us compare the coefficients here with coefficients of some existing studies. This 
has to be considered as an approximate exercise, since existing studies often 
involve stock options, may include only one performance variable at a time and 
estimation  methods  and  possibly  the  type  of  firms  vary.  Bertrand  and 
Mullainathan (2001), who use fixed effects in their estimations for the period 
1984-1991, find that when accounting returns rise by a percentage point, cash 
compensation rises by approximately 2 percent for US CEOs. Using data for 
1986-1995, Kato and Kubo (2003) find a comparable coefficient of 1.9 when 
regressing the change in the return on assets on changes in CEO compensation 
in a small sample of Japanese listed firms. A study by Kaplan (1994) comparing 
CEO cash compensation in US and Japanese firms in 1981-1984 finds that a 
percentage point change in income scaled by assets leads to a 0.7 percent rise 
for  Japanese  CEOs  and  a  1.8  percentage  rise  for  US  CEOs,  when  several 
performance  variables  are  entered  simultaneously  in  the  model.  If  the 
coefficients  on  current  and  lagged  ROA  are  added  together,  the  effect  of  a 
percentage point rise in ROA is shown to raise total pay by roughly 2.2 percent 
in this study, which resembles some of the above effects.  
 
6.2 Results: Pay for performance 
 
The results shown in the previous section do not yet reveal how different factors 
affect the performance orientation of pay. This section looks at this aspect by 
focusing on commission. Prior to examining the determinants of the share of 
profits handed to managing directors as commission, a brief account is given on 
what determines a firm’s tendency to pay commission. For this purpose, two 
fixed effects linear probability models are estimated, one with firm fixed effects 
(FF1) and one with individual effects (FI1). The results are shown in columns 1 
and 2 in Table 8. The third column shows the results of an individual fixed 
effects model (FI2) with the group trends that control for a potentially different 
trend in the tendency to pay commission between firms that implemented the 
corporate governance code at different times.  
 
Unsurprisingly,  current  year  performance  (ROA)  matters  for  whether 
commission  is  paid  or  not,  the  coefficient  being  significantly  positive.  Debt   30
pressure  also  lowers  the  probability  of  commission  to  some  degree.  The 
valuation ratio (MC) was insignificant and is excluded, since it includes more 
missing  observations.  Earlier  on  it  was  mentioned  that  CEO  pay  in  general 
appears  to  have  become  more  performance-oriented,  since  the  share  of 
commission in pay has risen and the share of managing directors in the sample, 
who receive commission has risen from 34 percent to above 51 percent between 
1998 and 2004. It is especially interesting from this perspective to assess the 
effects  of  the  introduction  of  the  corporate  governance  code  on  firm  pay 
practices.  The  coefficient  is  positive  and  statistically  significant;  the 
introduction  of  the  code  raises  the  probability  of  commission  by  around  10 
percentage points. The result is robust with both firm and individual specific 
effects to the inclusion of group trends and restriction of the sample to those 
firms that reported whether commission was paid in each year (see model FI2, 
Table 8). The effect would also be statistically significant and positive in a fixed 
effects logit model (not shown). The code is likely to affect board composition, 
but since this is controlled for in several ways
xlviii, one possibility is that the 
effect arises from increased visibility due to disclosure requirements.  
 
These  results  suggest  that  some  of  the  rise  in  the  share  of  firms  paying 
commission could be attributed to improved firm performance, but also to the 
introduction of a corporate governance code. A regulatory change aiming to 
improve on corporate governance appears to have prompted more firms to tie 
managerial  pay  explicitly  to  performance.  Kinship  does  not  affect  the 
probability  of  commission  alone,  but  the  coefficient  on  the  interaction  term 
between CEO equity above 10 percent and relationship with a board member is 
statistically significant and positive. The presence of nominee directors has a 
significantly negative effect in the individual fixed effects models and lowers 
the probability of commission by 6 percentage points. This result could partly 
be driven by the fact that some of the nominees are creditors and might for this 
reason wish to curtail opportunities for additional pay.  
 
Table 9 shows the results of the models explaining commission as a share of 
profits. Columns 1 to 3 relate to a fixed effects regressions with firm (FF) and 
CEO  specific  fixed  (FI1  and  FI2)  effects  and  column  4  to  a  CEO-specific 
random  effects  censored  Tobit  model  (RE(I)).  The  fixed  effects  models  are 
standard models that do not control for the censoring of the dependent variable. 
It is of interest to estimate these, since they are most suitable for comparing the 
results with those of the fixed effects models on fixed pay.  
 
The regressions include performance-related variables, but the coefficients on 
corporate governance variables or their statistical significance change very little   31
even if the performance-related variables would be excluded from the model. In 
fact, out of the performance or size-related variables, only sales is statistically 
significant in the fixed effects regressions.
xlix Debt ratio is significant only in the 
random effects Tobit model (RE(I)), but the result is in accordance with that 
found  for  fixed  pay;  the  higher  the  debt  ratio,  the  lower  the  share  of 
commission.  
 
There are some differences between the models in table 9, especially in terms of 
the size of coefficients, but similarities arise. The result shared by all of the 
models  is  the  significantly  positive  impact  of  a  relationship  with  a  board 
member on the share of profits paid as commission. In the firm fixed effects 
model  (FF),  being  related  to  a  board  member  provides  a  CEO  with  a  0.54 
percentage  point  higher  share  of  profits,  the  coefficient  being  statistically 
significant. The corresponding coefficient is 0.26 in the random effects model. 
The effect is not as statistically significant, if the share of family members on 
the board is used instead. The only model where the interaction term between 
CEO  equity  holding  above  10  percent  and  a  family  relationship  was 
significantly positive is the individual fixed effects model. However, if included 
on its own, the effect of being related to a board member is also significant and 
positive. This model version is shown in Table 9 (FI1 and FI2). Being related to 
a  board  member  raised  fixed  pay  by  10  percent  in  the  firm  fixed  effects 
regressions (Table 6), and being a member of the founding family by as much 
as  31  percent.  These  also  had  a  significantly  positive  effect  on  total  pay. 
Overall, the results suggest that a family relationship raises fixed pay, the share 
of profits handed to the CEO, and total pay. 
 
A further coefficient of interest is that for the ratio of non-executive directors. It 
is positive and statistically significant in all of the models in Table 9. A 10 
percentage point increase in the share of non-executives will raise the profit 
share by around 0.1 percentage points (varies according to specification). There 
is no evidence to suggest that such directors would raise total pay, perhaps even 
to the contrary (see Table 6). There is thus some indication that non-executive 
directors can influence pay practices, and appear to drive them more towards a 
performance related fashion. 
 
The results of some specifications suggest that the corporate governance code 
has had a positive and significant impact on the share of profits handed out as 
commission at the 95 percent level. The impact is significant in the random 
effects model (RE(I)) that includes group trends and uses the sample of firms 
that always report whether they pay commission or not as a robustness control. 
The implementation of the code raises the share of profits by 0.24 percentage   32
points. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the fixed effects models 
after the same robustness check is applied (see FI2 for a model with individual 
fixed effects, group trends and restricted sample). On aggregate the evidence 
suggests that the introduction of a corporate governance code has increased the 
probability that a firm pays commission (Table 8). The results also suggest that 
in contrast to lowering the level of pay, it may even have led to an increase in 
total pay.  
 
Foreign ownership is found to be associated with higher fixed pay and total pay, 
but  does  not  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  share  of  profits  paid  as 
commission. The effect is small, and we must keep in mind that the measure of 
total foreign ownership is imperfect as it includes many missing values for 1998 





The hypothesis tested in this paper is that optimal contracting and talent are 
insufficient in explaining the wage setting process of managers and that power 
relationships between boards and managers affect CEO pay. The paper finds 
support for the role of governance factors in pay and the managerial power 
hypothesis in Indian companies. The use of several performance measures as 
controls and the use of fixed effects models facilitate the identification of the 
effects of corporate governance variables. Accounting returns do have a positive 
impact on CEO compensation, but performance is likely to affect pay less in 
firms that do not explicitly tie pay to performance. The tendency to do so has 
risen over time, and this pattern explains partly the rise in average CEO pay 
over time, since a significant part of the increase in pay arises from an increase 
in commission. Commission as a share of profits has also rise, which suggests 
that performance alone cannot account for the rise in CEO pay over time. 
 
The paper shows that managing directors who are related to members of the 
board of directors, or are part of the founding family, or controlling group of 
shareholders, are paid more than those who are not. The fact that CEOs with 
family connections receive a higher share of profits as commission is somewhat 
counter-intuitive,  since  one  might  assume  that  the  need  for  an  incentive 
component is lower. However, both fixed pay and total pay are also higher. This 
result persists if kinship is measured as the share of relatives on the board. Since 
ownership translates into power, the extent of the managing director’s equity 
holding  is  also  found  to  affect  the  amount  of  additional  pay  of  CEOs  with 
family connections.   
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The  fact  that  fixed  pay  and  total  pay  are  higher  with  family  connections 
suggests that such connections could override rationality from the viewpoint of 
the  firm  in  the  setting  of  pay.  CEOs  are  not  paid  only  for  their  ability  or 
experience, but a family connection, which implies that they may be able to 
extract rents via pay. This suggests that the CEO has power to influence pay by 
affecting board composition and that the controlling group, or family, has power 
over  other  shareholders.  This  additional  pay  could  be  viewed  as  a  direct 
reduction of firm profits. A member of the founding family receives 26 percent 
higher total pay than a non-member, which represents 0.3 percent of median 
profit before interest and tax in the latest year. However, the effect of family 
relations  could  also  arise  as  a  consequence  of  a  near  monopoly  market  for 
managers. If the supply for family managers is scarce and there is a desire to 
keep  management  within  the  family,  related  managers  may  simply  have 
bargaining power over pay for this reason.  
 
The result reveals that other factors than a need to attract talent could lie behind 
the  claimed  rising  pattern  in  CEO  pay  in  India.  Internal  family-recruits,  or 
relatives of board members, are paid more than unrelated ones. This result is 
interesting from the perspective of meritocracy. In the case of several directors, 
the result on family connections could also arise partly because the family-CEO 
has been given more responsibility or is more able. The latter is a less likely 
explanation, because such CEOs come from a much smaller pool of potential 
candidates. The common reliance on related CEOs and the fact that factors not 
related  to  overall  firm  performance  matter  in  the  setting  of  pay,  reflect  the 
uncompetitive nature of the Indian labour market for CEOs. 
 
Family connections raise pay, but the results also show that the board can exert 
control  over  managerial  pay.  They  indicate  that  a  higher  share  of  non-
executives  on  the  board  of  directors  can  tie  more  to  performance,  without 
raising  total  pay.  The  presence  of  nominee  directors  of  government-owned 
financial institutions, or insurance companies, is found to lower total pay, and 
thus could also be considered disciplinary. However, such representation also 
lowers  the  probability  of  being  paid  commission.  Whereas  the  presence  of 
nominee  directors  thus  tends  to  discourage  pay  above  performance,  non-
executives appear to create incentives by encouraging pay for performance.  
 
The results on board composition lend support to the hypothesis that outside 
representation from the perspective of management can tie pay more closely to 
performance. This contradicts the usual perception in India that non-executives 
or nominees are inefficient monitors and have little power over board decisions 
and managing directors. Indebtedness has a somewhat similar effect as nominee   34
presence; it lowers fixed and total compensation, but also the probability that a 
firm pays commission. This suggests that debt pressure can create incentives for 
boards to take tighter control over the level of CEO pay, but the effect is rather 
small. 
 
During  the  period  covered  by  the  sample,  the  share  of  managing  directors 
whose  remuneration  included  an  explicitly  performance-tied  component, 
commission,  rose  from  34  to  51  percent.  The  introduction  of  the  corporate 
governance code is found to raise the likelihood that a firm pays commission by 
10 percentage points. This finding reveals that a code that aims to improve on 
corporate  governance  and  disclosure  prompts  firms  to  tie  pay  explicitly  to 
performance. This may be explained by changes in board composition, but since 
the  regressions  already  control  for  board  composition  in  several  ways,  one 
possibility is that the effect  can be  attributed to the requirement to disclose 
different components of pay. Tying pay to performance may be viewed as a 
sign of good governance. On the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the level of fixed or total pay would have fallen as a result of this regulatory 
change, perhaps even to the contrary. The positive overall effect could be a 
transitory one, but the introduction of the governance code could also be one of 
the  reasons  for  the  increase  in  CEO  pay.  It  is  tempting  to  speculate  that  if 
managers have power over their own pay and do not wish to look worse than 
other managers in similar firms, visibility of pay could potentially induce a race 
to the top rather than to the bottom in CEO pay.  
 
Since all of the firms in the sample are stock listed public firms, the result on 
potential  rent  extraction  in  a  family  context  could  be  of  special  interest  to 
minority shareholders. If rent extraction is to occur in such a noticeable form, 
the phenomenon could proxy for other rent-seeking activities that take place in 
family-managed firms. The practices could extend to other relatives working in 
the firm as well, as Bebchuk et al. (2002) suggest. This study informs about the 
effects of manager-board relations on the determination of CEO pay. However, 
the evidence does not allow us to make any conclusions about the overall effect 
of  family  connections  or  corporate  governance  standards  on  overall  firm 
performance. This is a separate research question that ideally requires long time 










i However, it is claimed that these practices led to hiding of income, which 
could  impede  a  truthful  comparison  of  managerial  pay  before  and  after  the 
changes in regulations. (Sarkar and Sen, 1996).  
ii  The  firms  in  such  groups  tend  to  be  controlled  by  the  same  dominant 
shareholder  either  directly  or  indirectly.  In  such  cases,  the  controlling 
shareholder may be tempted to tunnel resources from a firm where he, or she, 
has lower cash flow rights to a firm where cash flow rights are higher. Such 
transfers of wealth can lower the performance potential of the firm that loses 
assets. 
iii A more general, well-acknowledged problem with incentive pay relates to the 
difficulty  of  observing  individual  performance  and  the  short-term  nature  of 
performance measures used. 
iv  Additional,  statistically  insignificant  variables  included  by  Ghosh  in  the 
regression on CEO pay are CEO age and education, firm risk, diversification, 
presence of multiple CEOs and affiliation with a business group. 
vOther results of this paper on significant determinants of total CEO pay that 
bear resemblance to those of Ghosh (2006) are the significantly positive effects 
of sales and return on assets (ROA), although coefficient size varies. Ghosh 
finds that non-executive directors have a statistically significant positive effect 
on CEO compensation. This contradicts the results of this paper, which could 
for instance be explained by differences in the modelling approach. Ghosh only 
examines the total pay of the CEO, but does include commission and salary 
separately when assessing the determinants of total board compensation. 
vi See World Bank (2004) for further details. 
vii See www.sebi.gov.in for further details 
viii In late 2005, there were approximately 200 firms on the BSE A group. 
ix See e.g. “Report on the SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance”, 
February 2003. 
x See http://www.ficci.com/press/press1.htm 
xi Organised industrial activities include all industrial units registered under the 
Factories Act 1948 (units with power with more than 10 hired workers, and 
those without power, with more than 20 workers).  
xii CMIE uses a normalisation procedure to render certain figures of companies 
that use different accounting standards compatible with one and another. The 
number of indicators and companies for which data are available in the database 
increases  with  time,  and  currently  approaches  10000.  The  database  is 
continuously updated with more data for more firms, and the version used for 
this paper is that corresponding to January 2006.   36
 
xiii Extracts from the few latest company annual reports are included in Prowess, 
and these can hold information on managerial pay for these years, but do not 
include information on characteristics such as tenure, age or education. In some 
cases, these reports have been used to record manager pay. 
xiv  Access  to  this  data  source  came  initially  from  the  library  of  the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and then directly from Sansco Services 
for different years.     
xv Business group affiliation is unlikely to change over the time period covered, 
and information is only available for the latest year. However, since the models 
estimated are mainly fixed effects models, the fixed effect will among other 
things control for such affiliation. 
xvi  Source: Reserve Bank of India, Database on Indian Economy, 2005. 
xvii The rupee to US dollar exchange rate has fluctuated between 41 and 48 
during the period covered by the sample. 
xviii Since these are total assets and not just fixed assets, this is not necessarily 
surprising. The variation in the variable is also considerably higher for Prowess 
than the sample firms. 
xix The figure on average market capitalisation is available for roughly 4150 
public companies in Prowess. 
xx Regulations on foreign equity investment have been loosened since 1991. 
Foreign equity investment is still not permitted in some reserved sectors without 
approval from the government (Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) 
and a Cabinet Committee), but in many sectors foreign investment is permitted 
automatically. See http://indiainbusiness.nic.in for details. 
xxi Some of these are financial institutions that do not report details on executive 
pay for the earlier years. 
xxii There may be some variation due to some firms reporting smaller items such 
as leave encashment and others not. These are a small component, and usually 
excluded, so it can be claimed that the remuneration figures examined in this 
paper are comparable between firms. 
xxiii    Pocket  Book  of  Labour  Statistics  2001  &  2002,  Labour  Bureau, 
Government of India, Ministry of Labour, Shimla. 
xxiv  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  of  the  U.S.  Department  of  Labor, 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/History/ realer.011195.news 
xxv  Information  on  the  amount  of  commission  paid  or  whether  or  not 
commission was paid is missing for around 6 percent of the managers for each 
year between 2001-2004, but for between 12-17 for the years 1998 and 2000, 
when firms were not required to report all components of pay separately in a 
standardised format. If we restrict the sample to firms who report whether or not 
commission is paid also in the years 1998-2000, we still see an increase in the 
tendency to pay commission.   37
 
xxvi  Although  data  on  pay,  CEO  characteristics  and  corporate  governance  is 
available from year 1998, data on other firm characteristics such as performance 
is available in Prowess for previous years.  Performance variables for the year 
1997  are  therefore  used  in  the  analysis.  When  fixed  pay  is  regressed 
alternatively on the past and present ROA of the firm, the coefficient on the 
lagged variable is larger and clearly more significant. This could be considered 
a justification for the use of lagged rather than current performance variables.  
xxvii One problem with this approach is that a reliable inference cannot be drawn 
on  whether  the  firm  decided  not  to  pay  commission  one  year  due  to  bad 
performance  or  whether  it  simply  did  not  yet  have  such  a  pay  practice 
altogether. Secondly, if the sample were to be divided into years when a firm 
paid commission and those when it did not, the amount of observations per 
regression would fall considerably, as would the time dimension per firm or 
CEO. 
xxviii  The  regressions  use  a  robust  variance  matrix  estimator  (Huber-White 
sandwich) to cater for possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation between 
the error terms. 
xxix The differences between models with or without these CEO observations 
turned out to be both statistically and economically rather insignificant. 
xxx  This  model  is  related  to  the  censored  Tobit  model,  but  in  this  case  the 
assumption is that firms that do not report CEO remuneration are completely 
excluded  from  the  sample.  The  truncation  point  for  the  logarithmic 
transformation of fixed pay was set at an equivalent of the year 1998 deflated 
logarithm of Rs. 600000 (495000), at 13.1. This is somewhat higher than the 
real  value,  since  fixed  pay  is  often  only  one  component  of  the  total 
remuneration, the threshold for which is set at Rs. 600000. 
xxxi  Additionally,  market  to  book  ratios  and  an  annual  stock  return  measure 
taking into account dividend yield, were experimented with, but these were not 
found  to  be  statistically  significant.  There  is  a  perception  that  the  Prowess 
database is weaker in terms of the quality of stock market related variables (see 
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2002) than on accounting returns. For instance, data 
on  market  capitalisation  and  dividends  are  not  available  for  as  many  listed 
companies or as consistently as accounting data is. The variables on total assets 
and  ROA  are  likely  to  give  a  more  reliable  picture,  but  a  simple  market 
capitalisation based measure (per assets) is experimented with to reflect stock 
market performance. The focus is on profits, as it is known that this is the 
performance measure that firms use to determine the level of commission and 
according to which the upper limit on managerial pay is set.
 Export orientation, 
as a potential indicator for foreign competition, was experimented with, but was 
rarely statistically significant.   38
 
xxxii In order to maintain comparability between models, the dummy for CEO 
equity  holding  above  10  %  is  not  included  on  its  own,  since  it  cannot  be 
included  in  the  model  with  individual  fixed  effects,  as  it  does  not  vary  by 
individual. 
xxxiii  Another  interesting  category  to  examine  would  be  that  of  independent 
directors.  However,  prior  to  the  implementation  of  the  SEBI  corporate 
governance code, firms did not report this information and it was impossible to 
draw accurate inferences on director status in previous years on the basis of 
more recent information. 
xxxiv The same is done for market capitalisation, since it also had somewhat 
more  missing  observations  than  other  variables.  This  approach  can  be 
questionable, especially in the case of foreign ownership, where the number of 
missing observations is considerable, but the results on corporate governance 
variables  remain  largely  unaffected  if  the  two  variables  for  which  missing 
dummies are included are excluded from the models. The coefficient on foreign 
ownership  did  not  change  if  instead  of  one,  two  missing  dummies  were 
included, one for the years 1998 and 1999 and the other for 2000-2004. Two 
dummies could be justified, if the reason for why the variable is missing is 
different in the two periods.  
xxxv  Instead  of  using  total  foreign  equity  holding,  some  alternative  model 
specifications were estimated, where the shares of equity held by foreign and 
Indian  promoters,  foreign  institutional  investors,  and  other  institutional 
investors were included separately for the period 2000-2004. The variation in 
the data is smaller, and the results turn out not to worth showing and discussing 
in detail. 
xxxvi Whether the firm belongs to the BSE A-group was firstly determined on the 
basis of the status in the last year of the sample (2004/05). Then annual reports 
of these firms for year the 2000/01 (when the provisions of the code were to be 
implemented) were checked to see if they stated whether or not the firm was 
required to comply with the corporate governance code by end of year 2000/01. 
With  the  exclusion  of  a  few  additional  firms,  the  28  firms  in  the  sample 
identified as being a part of the A group, were also found on such a list in a 
study by Bhattacharyya and Rao (2005) on the effects of the governance code of 
stock market performance. A few firms that are now part of the A group were 
not in the year 2000/01, and a few that were then are not part of the A group 
now. 
xxxvii For a large part of the firms in the sample, it is not possible to identify with 
certainty those firms that complied with the code by as much as a year prior to 
the required date. 
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xxxviii  The  following  were  considered  as  part  of  this  category:  Bachelors, 
University  or  post-graduate  diploma,  Chartered  accountants  degree,  Masters 
degree (MSc, MA), MBAs and PhDs. Details on education are missing for a 
few directors in the sample. 
xxxix There is no straightforward procedure for estimating the marginal effects in 
such a model, which makes it difficult to interpret the coefficients (see e.g. 
Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 492). 
xl  A  fixed  effects  Tobit  regression  was  estimated  (see  Greene,  2004),  and 
encouragingly the results were rather similar to those of normal fixed effects 
models in terms of statistically significant coefficients. As is the case with fixed 
effects logit models, only those firms or individuals for which the dependent 
variable varies over time are considered. The model was estimated with Limdep 
8. However, the marginal effects appear to be unreliable and therefore it was 
considered sufficient to show the results of standard fixed effects model only.  
xli When performance variables were excluded, the coefficients on corporate 
governance variables and their significance changed very little in both models, 
which suggests that we should not worry about the effects of a potential bias on 
the performance variables. 
xlii Using lagged industry ROA (excluding the firm itself) as an instrument for 
lagged firm ROA raises the coefficient on ROA(-1) from 0.7 to almost 2.2. This 
variable is significant in the first stage regressions explaining ROA, whereas 
lagged industry export share is not. The rise in the coefficient is considerable, 
but doubt can be expressed about the exogeneity of the instrumental variable. 
However,  the  statistical  significance  and  size  of  the  coefficients  on  the 
corporate governance variables are largely unaffected. One message to deduce 
from this is that the coefficients on performance may be inaccurate, but this is 
unlikely to affect our conclusions about non-performance related variables. 
xliii A regression that includes only those managing directors who are not paid 
commission  did  not  lead  to  significantly  higher  performance  coefficients  on 
fixed pay.  
xliv The coefficient on “relative” is insignificant (although positive) if included 
alone without the interaction term in the model. 
xlv  Around  12  percent  of  the  firms  have  within  variation  in  the  variable 
capturing whether the CEO is related to a board member, and around 6 percent 
of the CEOs do. The values for the share of family members on the board vary 
over time for over a half of the individual CEOs.  
xlvi It might be that foreign listing was coupled with the introduction of stock 
options that although required, went unreported in the annual reports. 
xlvii The models were re-estimated for the period 2000-2004 including the shares 
of equity ownership for different categories, which revealed that depending on 
specification  the  possible  effect  of  foreign  ownership  on  total  pay  could  be   40
 
driven by both institutional ownership and ownership by foreign promoters. The 
equity shares held by Indian promoters did not have a statistically significant 
effect on managerial pay. 
xlviii The effect remains statistically significant if instead of the dummy variable 
for family connection, the share of family members of the board is used. 
xlix The valuation ratio (MC) was insignificant and is excluded, since it includes 
more missing observations. 
l  A  model  breaking  ownership  into  Indian  and  foreign  promoters’  shares, 
foreign institutional investors’ shares and other institutional investors’ shares 
for the years 2000-2004 did not yield many additional insights on commission, 
as  the  results  were  not  robust  to  specifications.  In  fact,  this  breakdown 
suggested that an increase in ownership by foreign promoters might raise the 
share of profits paid.   41
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Annex 1 Data set construction 
 
The construction of the data set was initiated with a set of annual reports on 
companies listed on the Indian stock exchange for the years 1998/99, 2000/01 
and 2002/03 with the aim to construct a three period panel dataset. The list of 
firms included was decided on the basis of the reports available for these years, 
and  designed  to  include  those  firms  for  which  information  on  both 
compensation and characteristics for managing directors could be obtained for 
both of the years 1998 and 2002. For an unknown reason a smaller amount of 
reports was available in the Sansco Services collection for the year 2000 than 
1998 or 2002. Reports for the other years, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2004 were 
obtained later on. Annual reports were not available for years prior to 1998.  
Due  to  the  introduction  of  the  SEBI  corporate  governance  code  in  2000, 
reporting requirements and the format of reporting changed. The availability of 
information in year 1998 largely guided the decision on which firms to include 
in the sample. 
 
Figures on managerial remuneration could have been available sporadically for 
a larger number of firms, but considering the magnitude of the task, the choice 
was made to restrict the number of firms to those who in year 1998 reported 
both  the  details  on  executive  pay  as  well  as  characteristics  such  as  age, 
experience,  tenure  and  education  for  the  managing  director  and  any  other 
employee whose total gross remuneration is above the annual threshold (in year 
1998, Rs. 600000). Therefore, not all possible firms will have been included in 
the  dataset.  The  information  required  is  presented  in  annual  reports  in  a 
standardised  format  with  the  often  titled  approximately  “Information  as  per 
Section 217 (2A) read with the Companies Act”. Since the changes in corporate 
governance  requirements,  information  on  the  remuneration  of  the  managing 
director  appears  usually  in  the  Corporate  Governance  Report  section  of  the 
Annual report.  
 
There are a number of firms, which should with high certainty report the details 
on CEO remuneration in year 1998, but fail to do so. On the other hand, some 
companies that are not legally obliged to report the details do so, and are thus 
included in the sample. For most firms with information for the year 1998, the 
details were also available in most consecutive years. However, some had not 
included the details on gross remuneration in some consecutive reports. For a 
majority of missing values per firm in the dataset, the annual report was missing 
for this year. However, if the managing director changed within the financial 
year, this observation is not included in the data set as it was not possible to 
obtain  the  equivalent  of  a  year’s  remuneration  for  the  individual.  The  final   46
dataset arrived at is an unbalanced panel dataset including approximately the 
same number of firms for the years 1998 and 2002 and somewhat less for the 
other years (see table A1 below). Both service and manufacturing sector firms 
are  included.  The  total  gross  remuneration  reported  in  the  annual  report 
represents the total for the year ending in March, and due to regulatory reasons 
should entail the same components for each firm. In some cases, certain smaller 
elements  are  excluded.  The  figures  on  remuneration  evidently  abstract  from 
unrecorded  perquisites,  not  all  of  which  are  quantifiable.  It  is  assumed  that 
differences between such practices are not large between firms. 
 
 
The data on board composition also comes from the annual reports. Every effort 
has been made to be consistent in the interpretation of information provided. In 
the majority of cases, the information on kinship is obtained from a footnote of 
the table mentioned in the previous paragraph as a source for remuneration. 
This states the family relationships between the managing director and board 
members.  This  information  is  not  available  for  all  years  due  to  changes  in 
reporting requirements, but it was generally possible to trace this information 
for all years on the basis of the names of board directors, as long as information 
on kinship was included for one, or more, years for the particular firm. In the 
relatively few cases, where this information was not available, I had to rely on 
surnames to infer a relationship. This is a less precise technique and can lead to 
some inconsistencies, but in most cases, the same family name appeared several 
times on the list of board of directors and the associations were relatively clear. 
Spouses  are  considered  as  family  members.  The  same  method  was  used  to 
calculate the number of board members who were related, or belonged, to the 
same family as the managing director. Again surnames had to be relied upon if 
the relationship was not stated explicitly.  
The information on promoters of the firm, that is required to determine CEO 
relation with founders, or controlling shareholders of the firm, is also obtained 
from the annual reports. In most cases, the information on whether someone is a 
promoter  or  not  is  available  in  the  annual  reports  only  after  the  change  in 
reporting requirements (year 2002 for the majority of firms). It is then assumed 
that someone who is named a promoter was also one in the first years of the 
sample, which is reasonable. This status does not change for an individual. In 
those relatively few cases, where this information cannot be traced from the 
annual reports for instance due a change in the managing director or insufficient 
reporting, company websites or other web resources on Indian companies were 
used. There are a few CEOs, who are considered as members of the founding or 
controlling  family  or  group,  although  this  group  would  not  represent  initial 
founders. This is the case for instance due to a complete buy-out of a foreign   47
firm by an Indian one. Since the CEO will still be the promoter, or controlling 
shareholder, or related to one, such situations were considered equal from the 
perspective of the effect of kinship on pay as were cases, where reference is to 
the  original  founder.  Information  on  promoters’  shareholding  is  available  in 
Prowess for the latest financial year. 
The presence of a nominee director is assumed only if it is explicitly stated in 
the annual report, or can be inferred on the basis of surname for a particular 
year from one or more annual reports of the company. The report can be for a 
different year as long as the person remains the same. The information on non-
executive directors is recorded along the same principles. Most of the annual 
reports contain this information in a separate section on corporate governance, 
as instructed by SEBI, since the year 2002/03. For earlier years, the information 
can be obtained from the page of the annual report that lists the members of the 
board of directors. Alongside the names, there is generally an indication of who 
is an executive, or non-executive, and who is a nominee, if there is such. If 
certain members are reported as executives, the rest are assumed to be non-
executives,  if  more  detail  is  not  available.  Despite  changes  in  reporting 
requirements, the information for each company appeared to be consistent from 
year to year.  
Although  the  dataset  was  constructed  on  the  basis  of  information  on  gross 
remuneration and manager characteristics being available in 1998, the sample 
used in the regression analysis is smaller, since it includes only those firm-year 
observations for which it is known for certain whether commission was paid or 
not  and  if  it  was,  the  amount  of  commission  paid.  Prior  to  the  reporting 
requirements specified in the SEBI code, information on commission paid was 
usually  reported  in  a  specific  section  devoted  to  schedules  forming  parts  of 
company accounts, but non-reporting was more common as in the latter years of 
the sample. The descriptive statistics in annex 3 are based on the sample used in 
the regression analysis. Table A1 below shows the differences in the number of 
firms between the full sample and the sample used in the regressions.   48
Table A1 Number of firms in alternative samples 
YEAR  FULL  FINAL 
1998  329  272 
1999  280  235 
2000  253  229 
2001  260  245 
2002  326  309 
2003  306  290 
2004  276  265 
Full  =  firms  initially  in  sample,  Final  =  all  firms  that  have  information  on  commission 
(included in regression models.) 
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Annex 2  
 




ROA = Profits before interest and taxes as a share of total assets (profit measure 
as available in Prowess). 
MC = Valuation ratio, end of financial year average daily market capitalisation 
as a share of total assets. This information is available on a more frequent than 
annual  basis.  The  value  used  here  is  as  of  end  of  March.  However,  if  the 
information is not available, but can be obtained for either of the two previous 
quarters (September or December), such values are used instead to maximise 
the number of observations. 
Debt ratio = Total borrowings as a share of total assets. 
Ln(Sales) = logarithm of annual end of year sales 
  
Founding family (FF) = A dummy variable for the CEO being a member or 
related to promoters/founders. 
Relative = Dummy variable for a CEO relative or relatives on the Board of 
Directors. 
Nominee  director  =  Dummy  for  the  presence  of  one  or  more  government-
owned  bank,  insurance  company  or  mutual  fund  representative,  or  in  a  few 
cases state government representatives. 
Share of relatives = Share of boards directors who are related to the CEO.  
Ratio of non-executives = Ratio of non-executive directors on the Board of 
Directors. 
 
In  the  case  of  the  last  two  variables,  the  total  number  of  board  members 
includes the CEO. There are very few firms, where the CEO would not sit on 
the board. Nominee directors are also non-executives, and family members can 
also be such.  
 
Foreign listing = Dummy variable for listing on a foreign stock exchange. 
 
Total foreign equity = Percentage share of total foreign holdings out of total 
equity.  
A total for foreign equity holding was obtained for years 1998 and 1999 from 
the  Bombay  Stock  Exchange  Official  Directory  for  a  limited  sample  of  the 
firms. For the years 2000-2004, the data comes from Prowess and this share is 
the sum of shares held by foreign promoters, foreign institutional investors and   50
NRIs/OCBs as of end of March (financial year). As with market capitalisation, 
this information is available on a more frequent basis and if the information for 
March  is  not  available,  but  can  be  obtained  for  either  of  the  two  previous 
quarters (September or December), these values are used instead to maximise 
the number of observations. 
 
“Missing dummies” are included for the valuation ratio (MC) and total foreign 
equity. This involves using a dummy variable that takes the value of one, when 
the observation is missing and a zero otherwise. A zero is then inserted in the 
place  of  missing  values  for  the  actual  variable.  This  raises  the  number  of 
observations that can be used. 
 
Corporate governance code = A binary (0 or 1) variable for whether the firm 
is required to implement the corporate governance code or not. 
 
Chair = Dummy variable for whether the CEO is a chairman 
Age = CEO age 
Tenure = Years the CEO has spent in the firm 
MS/PhD = Dummy variable for a Masters (or MBA, post-graduate diploma) 
and PhD degree. 
 
Many  directors  =  Dummy  variable  for  the  presence  of  more  than  one 
managing director. 
Commission  dummy  =  Dummy  variable  for  whether  the  firm  pays 
commission. 
 
Available for the last year in the sample (varies by firm): 
 
Shareholder > 10% = Dummy variable for whether CEO owns directly and as 
an individual more than 10% of equity in latest year in the sample. 
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Annex 3 
 
Table 1 Distribution of firms by activity 
   Sample Prowess 
Manufacturing  75.0  56.2 
Services  22.7  41.3 
Mining  2.7  2.6 
 
Table 2a Size, and ownership of firms in the sample (in Rs. Million, 2004 prices) 
Variable (1998-2004)  Mean  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
Sales  4840  0.0  167000  1840 
Market capitalisation   6570  5.2  726000  1697 
Total assets  6450  24.6  441000  1840 
Exports/sales (%)  15.4  0  125.6  1838 
Equity ownership shares (%), 
2000-2004         
Promoters  49.9  0.0  97.1  1263 
Indian Promoters  45.0  0.0  97.1  1263 
Foreign promoters and 
collaborators  4.9  0.0  92.0  1263 
Non promoters  50.1  2.9  100.0  1263 
Institutional   10.9  0.0  67.0  1263 
Mutual funds and Units trusts  2.7  0.0  23.8  1263 
Banks, FIs and insurance companies  5.9  0.0  50.0  1263 
Foreign institutional investors  2.3  0.0  56.1  1263 
Others  39.1  2.8  99.2  1263 
Private corporate bodies  7.3  0.0  84.9  1263 
Indian public  27.9  2.8  90.3  1263 
NRIs/OCBs  3.0  0.0  50.2  1263 
Any others  0.9  0.0  49.8  1263 
Total foreign equity (1998-2004)  10.3  0.0  92.2  1338 
Market capitalisation is the end of financial year daily average. Exports refer to the sum of 
foreign  earnings  from  goods  and  services,  FI  =  financial  institution,  NRI  =  non-resident 
Indian, OCB = Overseas corporate bodies owned mainly by Indians. The values in the table 
are averaged for all available observations for all years.  
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Table 2b Characteristics of listed firms in Prowess (in Rs. Million.  2004 prices) 
Variable (1998-2004)  Mean  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
Sales  3164  0  1599844  21832 
Market capitalisation  2681  0  4600719  17727 
Total assets  8143  0  1103264  21877 
Exports/sales (%)  13.9  0  3320  20922 
Equity ownership shares (%), 2000-
2004  Mean  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
Indian Promoters  45.3  0  100.0  12626 
Private holdings  43.7  0  100.0  12626 
Government holdings  1.6  0  99.7  12626 
Foreign promoters and 
collaborators  4.2  0  96.8  12626 
Non promoters  50.5  0  100.0  12626 
Institutional   5.9  0  94.7  12626 
Mutual funds and Units trusts  1.5  0  51.5  12626 
Banks, FIs and insurance companies  3.6  0  94.3  12626 
Foreign institutional investors  0.8  0  56.1  12626 
Others  44.6  0  100.0  12626 
Private corporate bodies  9.4  0  100.0  12626 
Indian public  32.0  0  99.9  12626 
NRIs/OCBs  2.4  0  75.8  12626 
 
 
Table 3 Finance and other (ratios), 1998-2004 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
ROA  0.09  0.10  -0.96  0.74  1840 
Net ROA  0.03  0.10  -1.01  0.56  1840 
MC  0.50  1.73  0.0  37.45  1693 
Debt ratio  0.35  0.23  0.0  2.24  1840 
Firm age since 
incorporation  31.6  21.1  0.0  108.0  1845 
Net ROA = profits after tax (net profit) as a share of total assets.  The values in the table are 
averaged for all available observations for all years.  
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Table 4 Managing Directors’ Remuneration (Rs.  2004 prices)  
Variable  Year  Mean  Median  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
   1998               
Total remuneration (,000)    2177.2  1366.2  0  37600  326 
Fixed pay (,000)    1535.0  1264.5  0  16900  326 
Commission (,000)    642.2  0  0  36300  326 
Commission as % of total pay     13.3  0  0  100  325 
Commission/profit  (%)    0.55  0  0  22.2  324 
% of CEOs with commission    0.34        326 
   1999           
Total remuneration (,000)    2512.1  1503.1  0  24500  277 
Fixed pay (,000)    1681.2  1390.8  0  19000  277 
Commission (,000)    830.2  0  0  21200  277 
Commission as % of total pay     14.5  0  0  100  276 
Commission/profit  (%)    0.52  0  0  6.5  273 
% of CEOs with commission    0.36        277 
   2000           
Total remuneration (,000)    3420.3  1991.0  263.5  50200  265 
Fixed pay (,000)    2234.3  1707.9  0  13500  265 
Commission (,000)    1192.2  0  0  46100  265 
Commission as % of total pay     16.8  0  0  100  265 
Commission/profit  (%)    0.60  0  0  6.7  264 
% of CEOs with commission    0.35        265 
   2001           
Total remuneration (,000)    4234.4  2195.3  0  84000  293 
Fixed pay (,000)    2182.5  1740.8  0  16800  293 
Commission (,000)    2051.9  0  0  81300  293 
Commission as % of total pay     21.5  0  0  100  291 
Commission/profit  (%)    1.07  0  0  15.2  291 
% of CEOs with commission    0.46        293 
   2002           
Total remuneration (,000)    4205.4  2294.7  0  101000  369 
Fixed pay (,000)    2529.1  1857.7  0  14100  369 
Commission (,000)    1676.3  0  0  99500  369 
Commission as % of total pay     18.2  0  0  100  368 
Commission/profit  (%)    0.84  0  0  12.4  365 
% of CEOs with commission    0.42        369 
   2003           
Total remuneration (,000)    4808.0  2736.6  312.0  120000  351 
Fixed pay (,000)    2710.8  1935.3  0  14700  351 
Commission (,000)    2097.0  0  0  115000  351 
Commission as % of total pay     21.2  0  0  100  351 
Commission/profit  (%)    0.85  0  0  8.4  348 
% of CEOs with commission    0.47        351 
   2004           
Total remuneration (,000)    6432.8  3466.2  272.5  134000  320   54
Fixed pay (,000)    3090.1  2410.0  0  25800  320 
Commission (,000)    3342.6  138  0  127000  320 
Commission as % of total pay      25.6  6.9  0  100  320 
Commission/profit  (%)    1.06  0.1  0  13.3  315 
% of CEOs with commission    0.51  1      320 
Commission/profit excludes negative values and one outlier value for year 2004 and one for 
year 2001. The denominator equals profit after interest and tax plus commission. There are 
altogether five observations in the data, where the firm has reported that total remuneration 
equals zero. In four of these, the firm has negative profits.  These observations are excluded 
from the regression analysis, since logarithmic form is used.   
 
Table 5 Board of directors and CEO characteristics (1998-2004) 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
CEO-specific           
Age  52.8  10.0  25  84  2166 
Years spent in firm (tenure)  16.3  10.2  1  54  2140 
University education*  0.92  0.27  0  1  2199 
MSc or Doctorate* (MS/PhD)  0.38  0.49  0  1  2201 
Related to a board member* 
(relative)  0.60  0.49  0  1  2196 
Founding family * (FF)  0.74  0.44  0  1  2201 
Share of CEO relatives on board  0.15  0.16  0  0.86  2197 
CEO Shareholding above 10 %*  0.16  0.37  0  1  2101 
CEO shareholding (%)  9.72  10.5  1  80.1  1102 
CEO Chairman*  0.28  0.45  0  1  2200 
Firm-specific           
Nominee director or directors 
present*  0.39  0.49  0  1  1843 
Ratio of non-executive directors  0.74  0.13  0  1  1839 
Proportion of firms in sample 
required to comply with corporate 
governance code       
   
Year           
2001  0.11         
2002  0.77         
2003  0.96         
2004  0.96         
* = binary (dummy) variables  55
Table 6 Determinants of fixed and total pay (fixed effects) 
  FF1  FF2  FI1  FF  FI 
Dependent 
variable 
FIXED PAY (Ln)  TOTAL PAY (Ln) 
PERFORMANCE     
ROA        1.35  1.38 
        [0.186]***  [0.194]*** 
ROA (-1)  0.71  0.72  0.67  0.86  0.79 
  [0.140]***  [0.140]***  [0.143]***  [0.203]***  [0.212]*** 
Ln(Sales)(-1)  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.18  0.17 
  [0.026]***  [0.025]***  [0.027]***  [0.029]***  [0.032]*** 
MC (-1)  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
  [0.006]*  [0.006]*  [0.006]*  [0.010]  [0.012] 
Debt ratio (-1)  -0.29  -0.29  -0.33  -0.35  -0.43 
  [0.101]***  [0.101]***  [0.110]***  [0.130]***  [0.138]*** 
GOVERNANCE           
Relative  0.10    -0.06    -0.08 
  [0.053]*    [0.092]    [0.092] 
Relative*  0.08    0.21    0.41 
shareholder>10%  [0.099]    [0.117]*    [0.138]*** 
Founding family     0.31    0.27   
(FF)    [0.084]***    [0.082]***   
FF*    0.07    0.26   
shareholder>10%    [0.137]    [0.151]*   
Total foreign   0.004  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.005 
equity  [0.001]**  [0.001]**  [0.002]**  [0.001]***  [0.002]** 
Foreign listing  -0.53  -0.55  -0.60  -0.35  -0.32 
  [0.132]***  [0.137]***  [0.140]***  [0.249]  [0.291] 
Corporate   0.07  0.06  0.09  0.14  0.13 
Governance Code  [0.040]*  [0.039]  [0.041]**  [0.043]***  [0.043]*** 
Ratio of non-  -0.10  -0.10  -0.16  -0.13  -0.21 
Executives  [0.123]  [0.122]  [0.126]  [0.127]  [0.131] 
Nominee director  -0.03  -0.03  -0.04  -0.08  -0.09 
  [0.038]  [0.038]  [0.039]  [0.037]**  [0.038]** 
CEO           
MS/PhD  0.03  0.03    0.06   
  [0.041]  [0.041]    [0.042]   
Age  0.02  0.03    0.02   
  [0.017]  [0.016]**    [0.017]   
Age^2  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  [0.000]  [0.000]*  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Tenure  0.01  0.00  0.12  -0.00  0.09 
  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.028]***  [0.006]  [0.029]*** 
Tenure^2  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]* 
Chair  0.07  0.04  -0.05  0.07  0.03 
  [0.040]*  [0.041]  [0.067]  [0.044]  [0.070] 
Commission  -0.11  -0.10  -0.10       56
dummy 
  [0.034]***  [0.033]***  [0.036]***     
Many directors   -0.10  -0.08  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01 
  [0.057]*  [0.058]  [0.054]  [0.079]  [0.085] 
Constant  13.18  12.68  8.31  13.10  11.73 
  [0.482]***  [0.476]***  [0.899]***  [0.486]***  [0.472]*** 
Observations  1952  1957  1952  1964  1959 
R^2 (within)  0.79  0.79  0.81  0.87  0.88 
Number of firms  302  303    304   
Number of CEOs      411    412 
*, **, *** = significant at 90%, 95% and 99% levels respectively. FF=firm and FI=individual fixed 
effects. The standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in 
all models and all models include year dummies. The R^2 in the fixed effects models takes into 
account  the  estimated  fixed  effects.  All  models  include  a  missing  dummy  for  variables  MC 
(valuation  ratio)  and  total  foreign  equity.  The  regressions  exclude  CEO  observations  that 
correspond to the first year that the CEO is in post. The sample for total pay is the same as for fixed 
pay. Age drops out in FI1as it is co-linear with tenure.  
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Table 7 Coefficients of interest with alternative model specifications 
  Fixed pay  Total pay 
   FF  FI  FF  FI 
Share of  0.2  -0.29  0.09  -0.15 
relatives  [0.199]  [0.269]  [0.196]  [0.249] 
          
Share of relatives*  0.47  1.17  0.56  1.07 
shareholder > 10%  [0.251]* [0.400]*** [0.260]** [0.446]** 
          
Corporate   0.07  0.09  0.10  0.09 
governance code  [0.046]  [0.045]**  [0.05]*  [0.052]* 
         
*, **, *** = significant at 90%, 95% and 99% levels respectively. FF=firm and FI=individual fixed 
effects. The R^2 in the fixed effects models takes into account the estimated fixed effects. The 
standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in all models 
and  all  models  include  year  dummies.  Corporate  governance  code  refers  to  the  coefficient  in 
versions of models FF1 and FI1 in table 6 that include group trends and a general time trend and 
the sample is limited to firms that reported whether commission is paid or not every year. In this 
case, the individual-specific fixed effects model (FI1) excludes age and tenure, since they are co-
linear with the each other and the general time trend. The coefficient on the share of relatives on 
the board would be significant (value 0.3) at the 90 percent level in FF (for fixed pay) if included 
alone without the interaction term. Conclusions on other variables remain unaffected if the share of 
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Table 8 Probability of commission (fixed effects) 
 
  LINEAR PROBABILITY 
  FF1  FI1  FI2 
PERFORMANCE       
ROA   0.69  0.77  0.59 
  [0.111]***  [0.116]***  [0.109]*** 
Ln(Sales)(-1)  0.03  0.03  0.04 
  [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.019]** 
Debt(-1)  -0.40  -0.41  -0.37 
  [0.084]***  [0.088]***  [0.087]*** 
GOVERNANCE       
Relative  0.15  0.15  0.18 
  [0.092]  [0.105]  [0.108]* 
Relative*  0.03  0.04  0.05 
Shareholder >10%  [0.043]  [0.066]  [0.069] 
Foreign listing  -0.11  -0.15  -0.13 
  [0.058]*  [0.044]***  [0.058]** 
Total foreign equity  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Corporate governance code  0.10  0.10  0.09 
  [0.025]***  [0.026]***  [0.031]*** 
Ratio of non-executives  0.07  0.08  0.07 
  [0.098]  [0.099]  [0.096] 
Nominee director  -0.03  -0.06  -0.06 
  [0.029]  [0.030]**  [0.030]** 
CEO       
MS/PhD  0.01     
  [0.036]     
Age  -0.00     
  [0.013]     
Age^2  0.00  -0.00   
  [0.000]  [0.000]   
Tenure  -0.00  0.01   
  [0.006]  [0.023]   
Tenure^2  0.00  0.00   
  [0.000]  [0.000]   
Chair  -0.02  0.03  0.07 
  [0.037]  [0.062]  [0.068] 
OTHER       
Many directors  -0.04  -0.03  -0.02 
  [0.042]  [0.050]  [0.054] 
Constant  0.25  0.36  10.71 
  [0.356]  [0.712]  [18.107] 
Observations  1993  1993  1732 
R^2  0.73  0.76  0.75 
Year dummies  YES  YES  YES   59
Group trends       YES 
Number of firms  303     
Number of CEOs    419  347 
Standard errors   ROBUST  ROBUST  ROBUST 
 
*, **, *** = significant at 90%, 95% and 99% levels respectively. FF = firm fixed effects, FI 
=  individual  fixed  effects.  The  R^2  in  the  fixed  effects  models  takes  into  account  the 
estimated fixed effects. Model FI2 includes group trends and the sample is restricted to those 
firms that had information on whether commission was paid or not for all years. The model 
FI2 excludes age and tenure, since they are co-linear with each other and the time trend 
variable that is included as a robustness check. The standard errors in brackets are corrected 
for  heteroskedasticity  and  serial  correlation  (ROBUST).  Regressions  include  a  missing 
dummy for total foreign equity. The models FF1 and FI1 include all CEO observations for 
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Table 9 Dependent variable: Share of profits paid as commission (%) 
 
  FIXED EFFECTS  TOBIT RE(I) 
PERFORMANCE  FF  FI1  FI2  ME 
ROA   -1.10  -0.38  -0.14  1.50 
  [0.709]  [0.413]  [0.316]  [0.327]*** 
Ln(Sales)  0.16  0.160  0.11  0.10 
  [0.055]***  [0.061]***  [0.055]*  [0.032]*** 
Debt ratio  0.27  -0.04  -0.15  -1.34 
  [0.378]  [0.299]  [0.272]  [0.181]*** 
GOVERNANCE         
Relative  0.54  0.61  0.55  0.26 
  [0.218]**  [0.218]***  [0.213]***  [0.071]*** 
Total foreign equity  -0.004  -0.002  0.000  -0.004 
  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002] 
Foreign listing  -0.28  -0.46  -0.27  -0.44 
  [0.189]  [0.166]***  [0.179]  [0.070]*** 
Corporate   0.14  0.20  0.11  0.24 
Governance Code  [0.091]  [0.085]**  [0.095]  [0.118]** 
Ratio of non-  1.12  1.13  0.79  0.59 
executives  [0.354]***  [0.373]***  [0.361]**  [0.239]** 
Nominee director  -0.22  -0.12  -0.10  -0.11 
  [0.139]  [0.100]  [0.080]  [0.058] 
CEO         
MS/PhD  0.20      0.20 
  [0.179]      [0.081]** 
Age  -0.04      0.01 
  [0.058]      [0.028] 
Age^2  0.00  0.00    -0.00 
  [0.001]  [0.001]    [0.000] 
Tenure  0.02  0.02    0.03 
  [0.024]  [0.095]    [0.011]*** 
Tenure^2  -0.000  -0.002    -0.001 
  [0.000]  [0.001]**    [0.000]*** 
Chair  -0.10  -0.05  -0.13  0.05 
  [0.157]  [0.218]  [0.233]  [0.078] 
OTHER         
Many directors  -0.18  -0.12  -0.18  0.08 
  [0.224]  [0.263]  [0.292]  [0.078] 
Constant  -2.66  -4.96  -66.17   
  [1.825]  [1.782]***  [65.904]   
Observations  2091  2091  1805  1676 
R^2 (within)  0.60  0.67  0.69   
Log Likelihood        -1686 
Year dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Group trends      YES  YES 
Number of firms  313       
Number of CEOs    440  359  328   61
Standard errors  ROBUST  ROBUST  ROBUST   
 
*,**,*** = significant at 90%, 95% and 99% levels respectively. FF = firm fixed effects, FI = 
individual fixed effects. The dependent variable is commission/(profit after interest and tax + 
commission) as a %. The standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation in the fixed effects models (ROBUST). The R^2 in the fixed effects models 
takes into account the estimated fixed effects. The regressions in columns FI2 and TOBIT 
RE(I) include group trends and the sample is restricted to firms that have reported whether 
they pay commission or not in each year of the sample. The column for the random effects 
Tobit (REI) shows the marginal effects (ME) for the unconditional expected value of the 
dependent. All regressions exclude in total thirteen observations, where either the dependent 
variable (share of profits) is negative or very high. In each model the dependent variables 
include values of zero, since the purpose is to capture situations, where insufficient profit 
leads to non-payment of commission. Model FI2 excludes age and tenure, since they are co-
linear with each other and the time trend variable that is included as a robustness check. The 
regressions FF and FI1 include all CEO observations for which the dependent variable can be 




Table 10 Correlation matrix for all observations (for variables in regressions) 
 
Ln(Fixed pay) 1.00                                             
Ln(Total pay)  0.83  1.00                                           
Commission/ 
Profit  0.01  0.07                                           
Ln(sales)  0.54  0.57  1.00                                         
ROA  0.18  0.37  0.27  1.00                                       
MC    0.15  0.21  0.19  0.29  1.00                                     
Debt ratio  -0.12 -0.23 -0.06 -0.36 -0.23 1.00                                   
Relative  -0.18 -0.10 -0.09 0.01 -0.10 0.08  1.00                                 
Relative*CE
O equity  -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.00  0.32  1.00                               
Founding 
family (FF)  -0.19 -0.07 -0.15 0.05  0.02  0.05  0.62  0.22  1.00                             
FF*CEO 
equity  -0.07 0.00 -0.13 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.12  0.81  0.27  1.00                           
Share of 
family 




O equity  -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.26  0.86  0.20  0.72  0.32  1.00                       
Foreign 
equity  0.31  0.30  0.23  0.11  0.16 -0.17 -0.14 -0.03 -0.17 -0.05 -0.16 -0.05 1.00                     
Foreign 
listing  0.26  0.26  0.45  0.06  0.18 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.15  1.00                   
Governance 




executives  0.08  0.02  0.05  0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.21 -0.07 -0.31 -0.08 -0.28 -0.13 0.07  0.01 -0.03 1.00               
Nominee  0.07  0.00  0.25 -0.11 -0.07 0.32 -0.02 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 0.16 -0.03 0.16  1.00             
MSc/PhD  0.06  0.08  0.00  0.05  0.03 -0.05 -0.11 0.03 -0.10 0.07 -0.09 0.02  0.12  0.11  0.02  0.05  0.04  1.00           
Age  0.15  0.11  0.09  0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 -0.08 -0.21 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 0.04  0.08  0.11  0.04  0.02  0.04  1.00         
Tenure  0.13  0.12  0.19 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.11  0.01  0.17 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.20  0.14 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 0.40  1.00       
Chair  -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.05  0.01  0.09  0.03  0.34  0.12  0.01 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14 0.01  0.04  0.24  0.20  1.00     
Two directors -0.02 0.02  0.11  0.03  0.04  0.00  0.20  0.00  0.19 -0.04 0.26  0.08 -0.04 0.03  0.03 -0.34 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.20 -0.09 1.00   
Commission 
dummy  0.14  0.48  0.27  0.38  0.11 -0.31 0.04 -0.02 0.07  0.02  0.02 -0.02 0.09  0.08  0.14 -0.03 -0.10 0.05  0.02  0.08  0.06  0.11  1.00 
CEO equity = Shareholder > 10%. 